



Brussels, 4.12.2014  
C(2014) 9146 final

**COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION**

**of 4.12.2014**

**on the 2014 special measure for the Syrian population to be financed from the general  
budget of the European Union**

## COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION

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### on the 2014 special measure for the Syrian population to be financed from the general budget of the European Union

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action<sup>1</sup> and in particular Article 2(1) thereof,

Having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002<sup>2</sup>, and in particular Article 84(2) thereof,

Whereas:

- (1) In light of the ongoing repression and restrictive measures taken by the Council of the European Union, the Commission has suspended its cooperation with the Syrian Government since May 2011. Since then, normal programming for Syria has not been possible due to the ongoing conflict but direct support to the affected population in Syria and in the neighbouring countries affected has been maintained under the European Neighbourhood Instrument through various special measures in complementarity to humanitarian assistance in sectors such as education and early recovery. This will be revised should the situation evolve towards a post-crisis state-building and reconstruction scenario.
- (2) The objective pursued by this measure to be financed under Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument<sup>3</sup> is to help the Syrian population to cope with the effects of the crisis and prepare for recovery. This special measure is made necessary by the dramatic worsening of the Syrian crisis.
- (3) Action entitled “Support to people in Syria affected by the crisis – Phase II” will contribute to help people in Syria cope with effects of the crisis and facilitate a peaceful and democratic transition. It will be implemented through grants to Civil Society Organisations.
- (4) Action entitled “Urban information and analysis to help plan and target humanitarian and recovery interventions in Syria” will contribute to improve the humanitarian and recovery responses to the Syria crisis through better urban information and analysis. It will be implemented jointly by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) and the EU Joint Research Center (JRC).

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 95.

<sup>2</sup> OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 27.

- (5) Action entitled “Education for vulnerable and displaced children in Syria” will contribute to improve access to education and to psychosocial support for school-age children in Syria. It will be implemented jointly by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP).
- (6) Action entitled “Scaling-up of emergency restoration and stabilisation of livelihoods of affected Syrian populations” will contribute to strengthening the resilience of the Syrian people to cope with the effects of the protracted crisis and enable those whose livelihoods were severely disrupted to recover and rebuild their lives. It will be implemented with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
- (7) Action entitled “Joint comprehensive EU framework for cross-border operations in Syria from Turkey” will contribute to provide basic services to the Syrian population and to strengthen local governance through the implementation of flexible and short-term delivery projects in Syria with local civil partners. It will also contribute to decrease community tensions by addressing the needs of Syrian refugees in Turkey. It will be implemented with Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).
- (8) It is necessary to adopt a financing decision, the detailed rules on which are set out in Article 94 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012<sup>4</sup>.
- (9) It is necessary to adopt a work programme for grants the detailed rules on which are set out in Article 128(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 and in Article 188(1) of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012. The work programme is constituted by the Annex 1 (section 4.3.1).
- (10) The Commission should entrust budget-implementation tasks under indirect management to the entities identified in this Decision, subject to the conclusion of a delegation agreement. In accordance with Article 60(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, the authorising officer responsible needs to ensure that these entities guarantee a level of protection of the financial interests of the Union equivalent to that required when the Commission manages Union funds. UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, UN-HABITAT and GIZ are currently undergoing the assessment under Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. In anticipation of the results of this review, the authorising officer responsible deems that, based on the entities’ positive assessment under Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 and on the long-standing and problem-free cooperation with them, budget-implementation tasks can be entrusted to these entities.
- (11) The Commission should authorise the eligibility of costs under indirect management as of a date preceding the adoption of this Decision for the reasons of extreme urgency in crisis management aid or in situations of imminent or immediate danger to the stability of a country, including by an armed conflict, where an early involvement engagement of the Union may prevent an escalation.
- (12) It is necessary to allow the payment of interest due for late payment on the basis of Article 92 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 and Article 111(4) of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012.
- (13) Pursuant to Article 94(4) of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012, the Commission should define changes to this Decision which are not substantial in order to ensure that any such changes can be adopted by the authorising officer responsible.

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<sup>4</sup> Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 of 29 October 2012 on the rules of application of Regulation No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L 362, 31.12.2012, p. 1).

- (14) The measure provided for in this Decision is in accordance with the opinion of the European Neighbourhood Instrument Committee set up under Article 15 of the financing instrument referred to in Recital 2,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

#### *Article 1*

##### **Adoption of the measure**

The 2014 special measure for the Syrian population, as set out in the Annexes, is approved.

The measure shall include the following actions:

- Annex 1: Support to people in Syria affected by the crisis – Phase II;
- Annex 2: Urban information and analysis to help plan and target humanitarian and recovery interventions in Syria;
- Annex 3: Education for vulnerable and displaced children in Syria;
- Annex 4: Scaling-up of emergency restoration and stabilisation of livelihoods of affected Syrian populations;
- Annex 5: Joint comprehensive EU framework for cross-border operations in Syria from Turkey.

#### *Article 2*

##### **Financial contribution**

The maximum contribution of the European Union for the implementation of the measure referred to in Article 1 is set at EUR 41,250,000 and shall be financed from budget line 21 03 01 02 of the general budget of the European Union for 2014.

The financial contribution provided for in the first paragraph may also cover interest due for late payment.

#### *Article 3*

##### **Implementation modalities**

Budget-implementation tasks under indirect management may be entrusted to the entities identified in the attached Annexes, subject to the conclusion of the relevant agreements.

The section “Implementation Issues” of the Annexes referred to in the second paragraph of Article 1 sets out the elements required by Article 94(2) of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012.

The eligibility of costs under indirect management prior to the adoption of this Decision shall be authorised as of the dates set out in the Annexes 2 and 3.

#### *Article 4*

##### **Non-substantial changes**

Increases or decreases of up to EUR 10 million not exceeding 20% of the contribution referred to in the first paragraph of Article 2, or cumulated changes to the allocations of specific actions not exceeding 20% of that contribution, as well as extensions of the implementation period shall not be considered substantial within the meaning of Article 94(4)

of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012, provided that they do not significantly affect the nature and objectives of the actions. The use of contingencies shall be taken into account in the ceiling referred to in this Article.

The responsible authorising officer may adopt the non-substantial changes referred to in the first paragraph in accordance with the principles of sound financial management and proportionality.

Done at Brussels, 4.12.2014

*For the Commission*  
*Johannes HAHN*  
*Member of the Commission*

**ANNEX 1**

of the Commission implementing Decision on the 2014 special measure for the Syrian population "

**Action Document for "Support for people in Syria affected by the crisis – Phase II"****1. IDENTIFICATION**

Title/Number	Support for people in Syria affected by the crisis – phase II CRIS number: ENI/2014/037-726		
Total cost	Total estimated cost: EUR 18,000,000 Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 15,000,000 It is expected that grant beneficiaries will contribute up to EUR 3,000,000 in joint co-financing.		
Aid method / Management mode and type of financing	Call for proposals Direct management – grants		
DAC-code	430	Sector/s: 43010	Support to livelihoods Education and vocational training Health and psychosocial support Independent media Promoting dialogue Building capacity and networking of Syrian civil society organisations

**2. RATIONALE AND CONTEXT****2.1. Summary of the action and its objectives**

The present Decision will endorse the call for proposals 2014/135-829<sup>1</sup> that has been launched in June 2014 under the suspension clause. It follows in the same steps as the previous call for proposals (133-773<sup>2</sup>) launched in 2012 and pursues, in a very difficult political and security situation inside of Syria to "help people in Syria cope with the effects of the crisis and to facilitate a peaceful and democratic transition." A

<sup>1</sup> <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/online-services/index.cfm?do=publi.welcome&nbPubliList=15&orderby=upd&orderbyad=Desc&searchtype=RS&aofr=135829>.

<sup>2</sup> <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/online-services/index.cfm?do=publi.welcome&nbPubliList=15&orderby=upd&orderbyad=Desc&searchtype=RS&aofr=133773>.

wide scope of activities is foreseen to allow grant projects a maximum of flexibility to respond to shifting needs on the ground.

## 2.2. Context

The Syrian conflict is having a devastating and lasting impact on Syria and across the region. With the conflict entering its fourth year, the needs of the affected populations for assistance, including 10.8 million people inside the country and more than 3 million refugees plus their overstretched host communities in neighbouring countries, are of an unprecedented scale. The number of conflict-related deaths has surpassed 191,000 individuals.

In 2013, the Syria crisis has transformed itself from a humanitarian emergency to a multidimensional and protracted crisis directly affecting several countries in the region - mainly Lebanon and Jordan, but also Iraq, Turkey and Egypt - whose social and economic capacity to deal with the ever growing influx of refugees is all but exhausted. All actors involved in the response agree that this massive challenge requires a comprehensive regional response not only including humanitarian aid but also longer-term structural support to host countries and communities through development instruments, especially as no political solution to the crisis are in sight in the short-term.

In response to the crisis the EU (including its Member States) has so far mobilised EUR 2.8 billion of assistance since the start of the conflict (EUR 1.5 billion from the EU budget and EUR 1.3 billion from EU Member States), making it the main donor in addressing the consequences of this crisis. In 2013 only, the Commission made an exceptional effort of EUR 685 million, notably thanks to the EUR 400 million additional package mobilised in the frame of the Joint Communication "Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis"<sup>3</sup>.

This assistance has allowed for urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance and supported the national and local capacities to deliver services for those affected by the crisis (Education, health, basic services such as water and waste management services, support to livelihoods, etc.), both inside Syria and in the neighbouring countries. In Turkey, until now, needs have been mostly covered by Turkey's national funds; only limited funding of EUR 13 million has been provided so far under the Instrument for Pre-accession which is designed mainly for institution building and not for emergency assistance.

The majority of the European Commission development assistance has been funded by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument<sup>4</sup> (ENPI) through a series of special measures for Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. This support has focused mainly on education, health and livelihood sectors and is expected to ensure that: 2.5 million children affected by the crisis are able to continue to go to school; 50,000 young people benefit from vocational or life-skills training; that 425,000 of the most vulnerable men, women and children have improved access to health services; that 760,000 of the poorest people affected by the crisis receive livelihood support; that the capacity of 85 local Syrian civil society organisations (CSOs) is improved; and that more than 1,100 activists, bloggers and journalists are trained.

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<sup>3</sup> JOIN(2013) 22 of 24 June 2013.

<sup>4</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:310:0001:0014:EN:PDF> .

In December 2012 a first ENPI funded call for proposals (CfP 133-773) "*Support for the Syrian population affected by the crisis*"<sup>5</sup> was launched and resulted in the award of 10 grants<sup>6</sup> for an amount of EUR 9.1 million in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.

### **2.3. Lessons learnt**

Since the launch of the last call for proposals on Syria<sup>7</sup> the situation concerning the implementation of activities inside of Syria has not improved. Obtaining information about the situation on the ground continues to be very difficult as the operation of international media and different organisations is limited by the regime or other armed groups. There are serious limitations for European NGOs to work directly in Syria at the moment. Obtaining authorisation for new organisations is nearly impossible. It is not possible for the EU to foresee any sustained direct monitoring in the short and medium term. In the same reasoning as for the last call for proposals (133-773), it is therefore suggested to support ongoing successful projects that are implemented by partners with a solid track record and a long experience of working inside of Syria and/or partners who can credibly demonstrate that they have access to reliable networks of Syrian partners that can implement the proposed activities. In view of the rapidly shifting security situation and the volatility of refugees flows, also inside of Syria, it is considered best to keep the scope of sector activities large and to remain as flexible as possible in order to be able to respond to changing needs not only in a timely fashion but also as durably as possible.

Currently the EU Delegation Syria is financing a number of grant projects that were selected under the 2012 call for proposals. While it is too early to evaluate results from those projects, the experience of managing them including knowledge of problems they encounter on the ground, adds to lessons learnt and is a bonus to the Delegation when assessing the viability and credibility of proposals received under the new call for proposals.

### **2.4. Complementary actions**

Grant projects supported through the present decision will complement already ongoing activities in Syria: grants funded through the thematic budget lines, as well as other EU funded projects implemented through United Nation's Children Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), mainly active in the education and early recovery sector in Syria.

The grant projects will be complementary to humanitarian activities in the designated sectors and selected projects will need to demonstrate added value in the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) framework. Grant projects may also be of added value in areas where larger donors/implementing agencies have access difficulties.

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<sup>5</sup> In the previous CfP "Syrian population" was taken to mean both; i) people living in Syria at the time of the start of the crisis in March 2011 (i.e not just people of Syrian nationality but also including Palestinian and Iraqi refugees among others) and; ii) people of Syrian nationality who may be living in Syria or abroad.

<sup>6</sup> Two grants were submitted under CfP 133-773 and placed on a reserve list. They were subsequently financed under the EIDHR instrument.

<sup>7</sup> See C(2013)6795 adopted on 10/10/2013.

European Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection is one of the principal actors in mobilising humanitarian assistance to Syrians. With a view to a particularly sensitive working environment and to avoid possible overlapping in EU assistance, particular care will be taken to ensure that specific actions are decided in complementarity with EU humanitarian assistance.

The Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF), which has been established in 2013 and is currently funded by a number of EU Member States and non EU-countries aims at funding larger scale rehabilitation projects inside Syria. There are gaps in addressing smaller scale actions that can respond to dynamically evolving need.

The projects will – where appropriate and operationally necessary – be coordinated with other actions implemented by other donors, in support of – or directly by - the Interim Government or any other structure of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.

## **2.5. Donor coordination**

The EU Delegation can no longer participate in donor coordination inside Syria.

Concerning Syria, due to the fact that assistance is using different delivery mechanisms ("cross-line" and "cross-border"), donor coordination is taking place in a number of different fora at different levels. These include:

- The informal "core group" on donor coordination for recovery, resilience, and development response to the Syria crisis which is chaired by the EU and includes key bilateral and multilateral donors. This group aims at improving the effectiveness of development assistance provided in response to the Syrian crisis, both inside Syria and in the neighbouring countries, but does not include humanitarian activities which are coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
- In addition, coordination is also conducted in the frame of the Working Group on Economic Recovery and Development of the Friends of Syrian People. Here the focus is on coordination of donor support to the opposition held areas of Syria which is mainly supported from southern Turkey (cross-border), although there is also cross line support.
- The UN also co-chairs a number of sectoral coordination meetings based in Damascus.

There is very close and regular internal coordination within the European Commission between the various services involved in the response and with the European External Action Service. The Joint Communication "Towards a Comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis"<sup>8</sup> helps provide the framework for coordinating all aspects of the EU response to the crisis.

In addition, the revised "Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan" (SHARP) provides a coordinated response strategy for all UN agencies and humanitarian actors.

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<sup>8</sup> JOIN (2013) 22 final of 24.06.2013.

However coordination at the regional/international level is not as important as coordination between the grant recipients and other implementers on the ground for grant projects implemented in a country that is behind a smokescreen. The EU Delegation tries to play the role of facilitator in the best possible way given the adverse circumstances of being evacuated to Brussels: A CSO consultation meeting was hosted in Brussels by the EU Delegation on the 9<sup>th</sup> of April 2014 in order to get the best possible input in the preparation of the guidelines for the call for proposals and a special session was held for CSOs active in Syria that are funded by the EU in order to encourage information sharing and best practices between different implementing partners.

Many CSOs active in Syria attend OCHA hosted Humanitarian Coordination/Working Groups, either in Gaziantep, Beirut, Amman or Damascus. However, designated coordination groups on non-humanitarian activities are generally lacking and the EU services try to play a coordinating role where they can. To that end, the EU common workspace in Gaziantep hosts regular EU coordination meetings to coordinate assistance in project form by EU bilateral donors. However the role of the EU Delegation remains again limited.

As a general rule and given the interest of the EU and its implementing partners to keep a low profile when operating in the country and not to put at risk project staff, it will be up to identified partners to decide what level of coordination suits best for each situation.

The call for proposals has been prepared and will be implemented in close cooperation with EU humanitarian aid, linking relief, rehabilitation and development for medium-term planning.

### **3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION**

#### **3.1. Objectives**

The global objective of the call for proposals is *to help people in Syria cope with the effects of the crisis and to facilitate a peaceful and democratic transition.*

There are three priorities for this call for proposals (CfP):

Priority 1: Addressing development needs (i.e. non-humanitarian) and increasing the resilience of people in Syria.

Priority 2: Contributing to development and social cohesion at community level.

Priority 3: Capacity building and coordination of CSOs in Syria.

#### **3.2. Expected results and main activities**

Intended results remain the same as those of the previous CfP: low-risk, high-impact projects of varying sizes addressing the short and medium-term needs of the Syrian population affected by the crisis.

Indicative activities (listed according to priority) may include:

**Priority 1 Addressing development needs (i.e. non-humanitarian) and increasing the resilience of people in Syria.**

- Support to income generating activities (IGAs) (technical, financial support) for both IDPs and host communities.
- Support to social protection safety nets, activities targeting the most vulnerable (with a focus on IDPs, vulnerable children, including orphans).
- Support to education activities (trainings of teachers, pedagogical support, small scale rehabilitation and equipment etc.).
- Non formal or informal education services (remedial classes, schools clubs etc.) with a focus on preventing the radicalisation of youth.
- Provision of vocational training services, especially for young people and in sectors relevant for the reconstruction of the country.
- Providing relevant medium term health related services (not including humanitarian activities).
- Providing psychosocial support services (building on and complementing existing humanitarian activities which focus on therapeutic support).
- Support to recreational, cultural and artistic activities as a means increasing resilience.
- Training of relevant actors (teachers, community members etc.) on psychological assistance.
- Financial support to third parties (sub-granting).

**Priority 2 Contributing to development and social cohesion at community level.**

- Promoting community level mediation, dialogue and reconciliation.
- Supporting community level coping mechanisms that contribute to peace-building.
- Supporting the empowerment of women at all levels of society.
- Addressing underlying causes of gender-based violence (GBV) including through awareness-raising.
- Design support mechanisms to deal with GBV trauma at individual and community level (building on and complementing existing humanitarian activities).
- Measures to enhance the wellbeing and development of children.
- Promoting cultural and artistic activities as a means of reconciliation and strengthening national unity.

- Trainings and networking of journalists and support to the professionalisation of media actors.
- Training and networking of citizen journalists and social media activists.
- Support to independent media.
- Protection of cyber activism.
- Conferences, seminars, fora (where these meetings are a means rather than the objective itself).
- Studies and assessments on constitutional issues, human rights and legal issues, etc.
- Financial support to third parties (sub-granting).

**Priority 3 – Capacity building and coordination of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Syria.**

- Undertaking and maintaining a mapping of CSOs' activities and CSO capacity building initiatives in Syria.
- Carrying out a needs assessment of Syria CSOs.
- Training in the roles and comparative advantages of CSOs (membership, accountability, funding opportunities, sound financial management).
- Improving coordination and dialogue among individuals, CSOs and between CSOs and other stakeholders.
- Setting up a database of training that has been provided to which organisation / persons.
- Working with other CSO to arrive at standard training modules / curriculum and a division of labour.
- Networking (establishing NSA networks and representative bodies, links to international NGOs, and academia, exchange visits and secondments to/from other CSOs in the region or Europe).
- Training on all aspects of project cycle management and grant applications (problem analysis, stakeholder analysis, log frames, sound financial management and audit, monitoring and evaluation, procurement principles, visibility).
- Training on CSO management issues (leadership, governance, accountability, sound financial management, internal structures).
- Training on advocacy (negotiation techniques, communication, public and media relations, support in publishing policy paper on specific issues).
- Training on CSOs' roles in human rights, legal issues and humanitarian and development principles.

- Training on the mainstreaming of gender and other cross cutting issues.
- Financial support to third parties (sub-granting).

### **3.3. Risks and assumptions**

#### Assumptions:

- EU continues with its policy objective of continuing to support the Syrian population;
- Beneficiaries in Syria is in favour of EU-funded projects;
- Syrian Government or military groups do not close down foreign-funded projects;
- Partners in Syria receive support and authorisation to carry out work by local authorities;
- Security situation does not deteriorate to a point where project activities are no longer possible;
- Partners provide accurate information on project evolution and delivery;
- Partners continue to be able to implement actions in compliance with EU instructions and policies;
- The crisis situation and therefore the needs of the population will not substantively change throughout the implementation period.

It needs to be acknowledged that projects supported via the CfP will most probably be of much higher risk than projects in normal circumstances. Interference on part of government or deterioration of the security situation will be constant risks to projects funded under this Decision.

The mitigating measures proposed are to work with solid organisations with proven track record and with ongoing programmes and/or solid networks in the country.

### **3.4. Cross-cutting issues**

All grant projects funded through the present Decision will need to:

- Fully integrate gender aspects into the project's objectives, activities and objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs).
- Demonstrate how they will support and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms (i.e. right to life, freedom of expression and association, equal rights, tolerance, human dignity, principles of non-violence).

In addition, each project will have to demonstrate clearly what their innovative solutions, experiences and added value are to master the variables of an unclear security situation and how exactly and by which criteria final beneficiaries will be selected and how results will be monitored.

### 3.5. Stakeholders

Initiatives to be supported will be identified and designed in close collaboration with the implementing partners, which will predominately be international/national CSOs.

Implementing partners will be encouraged to work as much as possible in cooperation with local CSOs, in order to help this sector survive through the crisis. Re-granting will be allowed for this purpose.

Principal stakeholders will therefore be local community actors inside of Syria and beneficiaries will be the local communities they are active in.

## 4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

### 4.1. Financing agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

### 4.2. Indicative operational implementation period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in sections 3.2. and 4.3. will be carried out is 48 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement or where none is concluded, from the adoption of this Action Document, subject to modifications to be agreed by the responsible authorising officer in the relevant agreements. The European Parliament and the relevant Committee shall be informed of the extension of the operational implementation period within one month of that extension being granted.

### 4.3. Implementation components and modules

#### 4.3.1. *Grants: call for proposal "Support for people in Syria affected by the crisis – phase II" (direct management)*

- (a) Objectives of the grants, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results

The priorities are to address development needs (i.e. non-humanitarian) and to increase the resilience of people in Syria; to contribute to development and social cohesion at community level and; to build capacity and coordination of CSOs in Syria as described under sections 3.1 and 3.2.

- (b) Eligibility conditions

In order to be eligible for a grant, the applicant must:

- be a legal person **and**
- be non-profit-making **and**
- be a specific type of organisation such as: Civil society organisations (CSOs) **and**

- be directly responsible for the preparation and management of the action with the co-applicant(s) and affiliated entity(ies), not acting as an intermediary **and**
- be established in; i) a Member State of the European Union **or**; ii) a country that is a beneficiary of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II set up by the Council Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of 11 March 2014 **or**; iii) a Member State of the European Economic Area **or**; iii) a developing country and territory which are not members of the G-20 group or a partner country or territory covered by the European Neighbourhood Instrument Regulation (EU) No 232/2014.

(c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for grants under this call is 80%.

The maximum possible rate of co-financing may be up to 100% in accordance with Articles 192 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 if full funding is essential for the action to be carried out. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the responsible authorising officer in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

(e) Indicative trimester to launch the call

The CfP was launched in June 2014 using the Suspension clause.

(f) Exception to the non-retroactivity of costs

Requests for exception of the non-retroactivity of costs will be made on a project by project basis if required.

#### **4.4. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants**

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act shall apply.

In accordance with the Article 9(2)(a) of the Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 and with regard to the regional nature of this action, the Commission decides that natural and legal persons from the following countries having traditional economic, trade or geographical links with neighbouring partner countries shall be eligible for participating in procurement and grant award procedures: Turkey, Iraq. The supplies originating there shall also be eligible.

The responsible authorising officer may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of

urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

#### 4.5. Indicative budget

<b>Module</b>	<b>Amount in EUR thousands</b>	<b>Third party contribution (indicative, where known)</b>
4.3.1. – Call for proposals " <i>Support for people in Syria affected by the crisis – phase II</i> " (direct management)	15,000	3,000
4.7. – Evaluation and audit	0	N.A.
4.8. – Communication and visibility	0	N.A.
Totals	15,000	3,000

The costs for evaluation/audit and communication/visibility will be included in the project budgets.

#### 4.6. Performance monitoring

The performance of the project will be closely monitored by the project implementing body. Appropriate reporting and reviewing measures will be built into each contract/agreement to ensure close follow-up on part of the Commission. The Commission reserves the right to carry out verification missions as needed.

The performance monitoring will have to be achieved using a mix of reporting by contractors, third-party verifications, EU Delegation staff missions to take part in activities that take place outside of Syria and financial verifications. Other Monitoring and Evaluation solutions may be agreed on. Innovative monitoring solutions adapted to the context are strongly encouraged by the EU Delegation Syria.

External results oriented monitoring missions may also be carried out by the Commission.

#### 4.7. Evaluation and audit

All evaluation and audit contracts will be awarded and implemented by the European Commission in accordance with the procedures and standard documents laid down and published by the Commission for the implementation of external operations, in force at the time of the launch of the procedure in question. According to the implementation modalities, initiatives could also be subject to an annual financial and system audit launched by the European Commission as well as in some cases results oriented monitoring.

If deemed necessary, an external final evaluation, covering all the activities of the action, will be carried out in accordance with European Commission procedures, if the security situation allows access to Syria.

#### **4.8. Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated before the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 4.5 above.

The measures shall be implemented either (a) by the Commission, and/or (b) by the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, financing agreements, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

**ANNEX 2**

of the Commission implementing Decision on the 2014 special measure for the Syrian population

**Action Document for "Urban information and analysis to help plan and target humanitarian and recovery interventions in Syria"**

**1. IDENTIFICATION**

Title/Number	<b>Urban information and analysis to help plan and target humanitarian and recovery interventions in Syria</b> CRIS number: ENI/2014/037-727		
Total cost	Total estimated cost: EUR 4,583,746 Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 2,200,000. This action is co-financed in joint co-financing by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) for an amount of EUR 1,972,331.</li> <li>• United Nations - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) for an amount of EUR 411,415.</li> </ul>		
Aid method / Management mode and type of financing	Project Approach Indirect management with United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) Direct management through an administrative arrangement with Joint Research Centre (JRC)		
DAC-code	998 – Not specified	Sector	99810 – Not specified sector

**2. RATIONALE AND CONTEXT**

**2.1. Summary of the action and its objectives**

The project will contribute to improving the humanitarian and recovery responses to the Syria crisis through better urban information and analysis. This is to be done through:

- (a) Improving beneficiary identification and needs assessment through city and neighbourhood profiles.
- (b) Better linking humanitarian and recovery interventions.
- (c) Improving monitoring of conditions in cities through satellite-based and field verification.

- (d) Improving coordination between support to households of internally displaced persons and support to host communities.
- (e) Linking satellite-based analysis with field verification.

## **2.2. Context**

### *2.2.1. Country context*

#### 2.2.1.1. Economic and social situation and poverty analysis

Syria is now in its fourth year of crisis and war. The gross domestic product (GDP) has contracted considerably with estimates ranging from 40% to 60%, as of early 2014. The country's economic infrastructure and capital stock have been damaged to a similar – or even larger – extent with profound urban impact: damage, destruction and displacement are concentrated in urban centres and cities. Hundreds of thousands of public facilities, homes and buildings have been damaged or destroyed. Population displacement is also massive. 6.5 to 7.6 million Syrians are internally displaced, with more than 85% living in host communities, mainly in urban areas. The UN estimates that approximately 10.8 million people are in need inside Syria. A further 3 million Syrians have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. These numbers mask a far more complicated urban reality. Patterns of destruction and displacement vary greatly, both within and between cities.

#### 2.2.1.2. National development policy

Until 2011 Syria's national development objectives had been laid out in a series of ten 5 year plans. The 11th plan for 2011-2015 was drafted but not adopted. Due to the violence and unacceptable human rights situation, the EU Council suspended EU bilateral cooperation with the Government of Syria in May 2011. Since then, EU's economic and development assistance to cope with the Syrian crisis under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and its successor the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) has been used inside Syria to address the medium to longer term needs of the affected population in complementarity to humanitarian assistance. The main priorities with regard to both humanitarian and early recovery actions are outlined in the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) January to December 2014 prepared in coordination between the United Nations System, the Government of Syria, and humanitarian actors in Syria. This project supports a number of the activities foreseen under strategic objective n°4 of SHARP on strengthening the assessment, planning, implementation and monitoring capacities of international, national and local partners for a coherent and coordinated early recovery and livelihoods response.

### *2.2.2. Sector context: policies and challenges*

Urban information and analysis lie at the core of understanding how communities are coping with Syria's prolonged crisis and how urban infrastructure, services and markets are functioning. The support to sharing, collecting, managing, analysing and using existing or emerging information is crucial for local decision-making but also to improve:

- Humanitarian response and by better targeting vulnerable populations, identifying “hot spots” where urban systems are under extreme stress and

"black spots" where shelter, water, education or health or other support is required, but has not been delivered.

- Recovery activities by providing accurate information to identify priority needs.

The project with the expected contribution of World Bank (WB) SIRI platform experts is a cornerstone in the concrete implementation for Syria of the 2009 memorandum of understanding between the WB, the EU and the United Nations (UN) on joint Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA). Such joint PCNAs have for example been conducted in Haiti (2004), Georgia (2008), or Pakistan (2010).

### **2.3. Lessons learnt**

This project intends to build on:

- The Study "Preliminary Assessment of Damage to Physical Structure in Syria" which was successfully carried out by the European Commission Joint Research Center (JRC) in 13 Syrian cities and towns during 2013-14 within the framework of the administrative arrangement ENPI/2013/321-100 (JRC-33270-2013).
- UN-Habitat's city profiling programme inside Syria aiming at providing technical support to the continuous assessment of critically affected cities in Syria on issues of displacement, damage, shelter, infrastructure, basic services and livelihoods. Profiles have been developed for Aleppo, Homs, Dara'a and Lattakia, as well as neighbourhood profiles in Aleppo, and Rif Damascus. A separate profile has been prepared for the "old city" neighbourhoods of Homs. Currently, UN-Habitat is developing a profile of Deir-ez-Zor.

From these 2 interventions and the difficulty to cover all impacted urban and city neighbourhood areas there appeared a clear need to exploit the complementarity between field and satellite analyses to improve the humanitarian and recovery responses.

### **2.4. Complementary actions**

The project is clearly deemed to support all actions funded by humanitarian and recovery/development bilateral and multilateral donors.

The present action is complementary to the World Bank SIRI platform that aims at setting a portal to collect all available information regarding the Syria conflict (both pre-2011 and current). Methodological results obtained through this project could also be replicated in other crisis areas.

The project will also consider other ongoing projects in related fields, such as the mapping exercise done by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) with the involvement of the SOC-ACU (Syrian Opposition Coalition Assistance Coordination Unit), ACTED (Agence pour la Coopération Technique et le Développement) and other partners.

The project will – where appropriate and operationally necessary – be coordinated with other actions implemented by other donors, in support of – or directly by - the Interim Government or any other structure of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.

## **2.5. Donor coordination**

Concerning Syria, due to the fact that assistance is using different delivery mechanisms ("cross-line" and "cross-border"), donor coordination is taking place in a number of different fora at different levels. These include:

- The informal "core group" on donor coordination for recovery, resilience, and development response to the Syria crisis which is chaired by the EU and includes key bilateral and multilateral donors. This group aims at improving the effectiveness of development assistance provided in response to the Syrian crisis, both inside Syria and in the neighbouring countries, but does not include humanitarian activities which are coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
- In addition, coordination is also conducted in the frame of the Working Group on Economic Recovery and Development of the Friends of Syrian People. Here the focus is on coordination of donor support to the opposition held areas of Syria which is mainly supported from southern Turkey (cross-border), although there is also cross line support.
- The UN also co-chairs a number of sectoral coordination meetings based in Damascus.

There is very close and regular internal coordination within the European Commission between the various services involved in the response and with the European External Action Service. The Joint Communication "Towards a Comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis"<sup>1</sup> helps provide the framework for coordinating all aspects of the EU response to the crisis.

In addition, the revised "Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan" (SHARP) provides a coordinated response strategy for all UN agencies and humanitarian actors.

This project will be a crucial EU contribution to a common database and analysis for the recovery and reconstruction needs of Syria and will allow the EU to take adequate leadership in this context.

## **3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION**

### **3.1. Objectives**

The overall objective of this project is to contribute to better urban information and analysis in Syria in order to better plan, target and monitor humanitarian/recovery

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<sup>1</sup> JOIN (2013) 22 final of 24.06.2013

interventions as well as to have available data and analyses for a future PCNA when conditions allow.

The specific objective is to provide technical support to the continuous analysis of critically affected cities in Syria on issues of damage, displacement, shelter, infrastructure, basic services, and livelihoods.

### **3.2. Expected results and main activities**

Result 1: A comprehensive urban information and analysis framework for Syria is set up.

Activities: Combining the strengths of both satellite-based (JRC) and field-based (UN-Habitat) methodologies, related activities for this deliverable will include:

- 1.1 Drafting of a strategic coordination plan for the partnership between UN-Habitat and JRC including for the elaboration of the final synthesis report on "State of Syrian Cities".
- 1.2 Convening a series of technical workshops to review existing products, templates and methodologies with information users and key stakeholders (humanitarian actors, NGOs, local authorities, charities, professional associations, etc.).
- 1.2 Convening a coordination workshop, to bring together the different actors to agree on information sharing procedures and urban methodology.
- 1.3 Developing information and mapping products and info-graphics leveraging satellite and field-based analysis.
- 1.4 Producing a short summary report on the integrated approach and methodology covering also possible replication in other areas in crisis.
- 1.5 Adjusting work-plans and deliverables as required.

Result 2: 20 new or updated city profiles and 30 neighbourhood profiles, integrating damage, displacement and urban functionality analyses combining satellite-based and in-country methods.

Activities:

- 2.1 Identifying local facilitators and establishing profiling teams in each city.
- 2.2 Identifying and coordinating with humanitarian actors, charities, local community initiatives, professional networks, etc.
- 2.3 Coordinating with local and central authorities to develop baseline data and Geographic Information System (GIS) base maps.
- 2.4 Updating and coordinating data sets on the neighbourhood's level which reflects pre- and post-crisis data sets.
- 2.5 Compiling and reviewing all previous reports and analyses.

- 2.6 Compiling update information on the current humanitarian needs and services conditions in the city and neighbourhood's levels and reflect internal displaced people and host communities concerns and needs through the local facilitators.
- 2.7 Ensuring accuracy and endorsement of all collected data with the relevant local and central authorities as well as relevant international agencies.
- 2.8 Preparing preliminary drafts of city profiles with maps and conducting focus groups with local actors for input and feedback through round table meetings.
- 2.9 Peer reviewing profiles with sectoral experts.
- 2.10 Ensuring proper lay-outing of maps, graphics and illustrations.
- 2.11 Preparing final RCP reports and ensuring timely delivery and full endorsement by key layers of partners.

Result 3: An Urban Information Management and Coordination System is developed for 10 municipalities.

Activities:

- 3.1 Based on the lessons from the 2013-14 pilots in Lattakia and Rif Damascus, developing Terms of Reference for an urban information management system.
- 3.2 Conducting 10 training workshops with municipalities and partners on city profiling tools and methodology.
- 3.3 Providing technical, mapping, training and other support to municipalities to serve as hubs for local urban information management and enhance connectivity to humanitarian actors.
- 3.4 Producing up to 10 “Who is doing What, Where” maps.
- 3.5 Strengthening existing loose networks in key cities composed of civil society and professionals for improving urban information analysis.
- 3.6 Providing “on-the-job training” in 10 cities to monitor the city-level humanitarian trends through neighbourhood consultations, data collection, GIS mapping and establishing databases on needs, types of damaged properties, hosting needs, tenure situation, jobs and skills, water and sanitation and other public services.
- 3.7 Facilitating communities to conduct their respective neighbourhood profiling through technical assistance and translate them into actionable neighbourhood profiles.
- 3.8 Evaluating the effectiveness of the capacity-development and outreach approach.

Result 4: A Syria Web-based portal is set up aiming at establishing a future PCNA.

Activities:

- 4.1 Assessing the needs of stakeholders, including coordination with other initiatives such as the World Bank's SIRI platform.
- 4.2 Reviewing the portal to enhance functionality for a wider range of stakeholders, including in particular, Syria-based stakeholders.
- 4.3 Reviewing and developing "dashboards" and info-graphics.
- 4.4 Technical designing and programming to strengthen the portal, info-graphics, and explore possibilities for real-time updates.
- 4.5 Organising sensitisation and outreach sessions to promote the use of the portal.
- 4.6 Monitoring of use contributing to end-of-project evaluation.

Result 5: Final "State of Syrian Cities" Synthesis Report.

Activities:

- 5.1 Contracting local partners to support the written analysis (e.g. universities).
- 5.2 Selecting indicators and issues to highlight across cities.
- 5.3 Launching sectoral studies: water, food security, solid waste, roads, electricity, economy, housing, HLP, health, education, etc.
- 5.4 Designing the report, including tables, charts and other info-graphics.
- 5.5 Editing and compiling the chapters.
- 5.6 Peer reviewing by sectoral experts.
- 5.7 Printing and dissemination.

### **3.3. Risks and assumptions**

The risks of operating in Syria during the conflict are clearly significant. A high degree of flexibility is necessary to ensure projects can adapt to the changing situation on the ground. The main risk is a deterioration of the already grave security situation in Syria thus requiring a temporary or permanent relocation of staff and activities.

The main assumptions include; i) that UN-Habitat and JRC are able to operate effectively in Syria; ii) that UN Habitat is able to operate in both Government and opposition held areas.

### **3.4. Cross-cutting issues**

Issues of human rights and gender equality are taken into account. Indicators will be broken down by gender where relevant and feasible.

### **3.5. Stakeholders**

The project will be based on a strategic partnership between UN-Habitat and JRC but all bodies interested in humanitarian, recovery and reconstruction activities like international organisations, national donors' agencies, charities, NGOs and national, regional and local authorities are potential stakeholders.

UN-Habitat Syria works with local partners including NGOs, charities, governorates, local authorities, professional and humanitarian associations.

UN-Habitat's emergency information management experts, GIS experts, and urban professionals are based in Damascus. Data collection coordinators and field teams are located within cities being profiled.

JRC is the Commission's in-house science service.

## **4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**

### **4.1. Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 184(2) (b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

### **4.2. Indicative operational implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in sections 3.2. and 4.3. will be carried out is 36 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement or, where none is concluded, from the adoption of this Action Document, subject to modifications to be agreed by the responsible authorising officer in the relevant agreements. The European Parliament and the relevant Committee shall be informed of the extension of the operational implementation period within one month of that extension being granted.

### **4.3. Implementation components and modules**

#### *4.3.1. Indirect management with an international organisation*

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with UN-Habitat, with the objective to contribute to better Urban Information and Analysis in Syria in order to better plan, target and monitor humanitarian/recovery interventions as well as to have available data in accordance with Article 58(1)c of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. This implementation is justified because; i) bilateral aid is currently suspended and; ii) This organisation has an international mandate to implement some activities foreseen in the project.

The entrusted entity would be responsible for the award, signing and management of contracts (grants and procurement) and for making payments.

The entrusted entity is currently undergoing the ex-ante assessment in accordance with Article 61(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. In anticipation of the results of this review, the responsible authorising officer deems that, based on a

preliminary evaluation and on the long-standing and problem-free cooperation with this entity, it can be entrusted with budget-implementation tasks under indirect management.

The Commission authorises that the costs incurred by the entrusted entity UN-Habitat may be recognised as eligible as of 1<sup>st</sup> October 2014. This authorisation is required for 2 reasons:

1. Field information and UN-Habitat analytical capacity of needs and vulnerabilities are urgently required for the preparation of the SHARP 2015 which has just been launched on 10/09/2014.
2. There is an issue of continuity. The contribution from the EU in the interim period after expiration of UN-Habitat former funding will ensure that the capacity is not only maintained but can also be used to support both SHARP and UN Resolution 2165 activities.

#### 4.3.2. *Direct management - Administrative arrangement with Joint Research Centre*

According to the Council conclusions of 26.04.1994<sup>2</sup> on the role of the JRC and to the offer supplied by JRC to the European Commission Directorate General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO) on its request for a project entitled "*An Urban Information and Analysis to help plan and target humanitarian and recovery interventions in Syria*", DG DEVCO entrusts JRC's Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen with the execution of the above mentioned project through an administrative arrangement.

#### 4.4. **Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants**

Subject to the following, the geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act shall apply.

In accordance with the Article 9(2)(a) of the Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 and with regard to the regional nature of this action, the Commission decides that natural and legal persons from the following countries having traditional economic, trade or geographical links with neighbouring partner countries shall be eligible for participating in procurement and grant award procedures: Turkey, Iraq. The supplies originating there shall also be eligible.

The responsible authorising officer may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

#### 4.5. **Indicative budget**

<b>Module</b>	<b>Amount in EUR</b>	<b>Third party contribution</b>
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<sup>2</sup> J.O.C 126 of 07.05.1994 p.1.

	<b>thousands</b>	<b>(indicative, where known)</b>
4.3.1. Indirect management with UN-Habitat	1,860	2,384
4.3.2. Administrative arrangement with JRC	310	0
4.7. Evaluation and audit	30	N.A.
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,200</b>	<b>2,384</b>

#### **4.6. Performance monitoring**

Appropriate reporting measures indicators and quantitative targets will be incorporated into each of the two agreements foreseen. While primary responsibility for the monitoring of the performance of each of the components rests with the implementing organisation, the EU will closely monitor performance by each of the implementing organisations and reserves the right to carry out verification missions as necessary.

#### **4.7. Evaluation and audit**

Both components on the indirect management with UN-Habitat and the administrative arrangement with JRC will include a final ‘end of term’ review as part of their respective agreement and will be paid for under it.

For the administrative arrangement the EU may contract an independent evaluation to be paid from budget line 4.7.

The EU may undertake an *ad hoc* overall final evaluation covering both components at the end of implementation if considered necessary. Any such evaluation would be contracted by the EU.

The delegation agreement with UN-Habitat shall be subject to the auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules and directives of that organisation.

The EU may undertake an *ad hoc* overall final audit covering the 2 components at the end of implementation if considered necessary. Any such audit would be contracted by the EU and paid from budget line 4.7. An indicative amount of EUR 30,000 has been allocated for evaluations and audits. This is in addition to the amounts for audit and evaluations to be contracted under the specific agreements.

#### **4.8. Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated before the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 4.5 above.

The measures shall be implemented either (a) by the Commission, and/or (b) by the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, financing agreements, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

**ANNEX 3**

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the 2014 special measure for the Syrian population

**Action Document for Education for vulnerable and displaced children in Syria****1. IDENTIFICATION**

Title/Number	Education for vulnerable and displaced children in Syria CRIS number: 2014/037-730		
Total cost	Total estimated cost: EUR 16,923,000 Total amount of EU contribution: EUR 15,000,000 This action is co-financed in parallel co-financing by Japan and Saudi Arabia for an amount of EUR 1,923,000.		
Aid method / Management mode and type of financing	Project Approach Component 1- Indirect Management with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Component 2- Indirect Management with the World Food Programme (WFP)		
DAC-code	112	Sector: 11220	Primary education

**2. RATIONALE AND CONTEXT****2.1. Summary of the action and its objectives**

This action is designed to help mitigate the impact of the current crisis in Syria. It aims to complement on-going humanitarian activities in Syria by addressing the medium and long term requirements of those in need. The action supports a number of the early recovery elements of the revised "Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan" (SHARP) for the period January to December 2013. While many refugees are leaving Syria to escape the violence, others are leaving due to the fact that they cannot access basic services and/or have no means of income. Unless the situation in Syria is improved – in terms of basic services and income earning potential – these factors will continue to swell the number of Syrian refugees leaving for neighbouring countries, notably Lebanon and Jordan. From both a political and development perspective, it is preferable to address the needs of the affected Syrian population inside Syria, before they become refugees in neighbouring countries. Besides, the needs of all kind inside Syria, in particular among internally displaced persons (IDPs), are huge. Providing assistance during a civil war is challenging, because of limited access due to the security situation and because of limited implementation capacity on the ground.

There is consensus that the current crisis is having a disproportionate impact on women and children. The UN estimates that more than 10.8 million people – nearly half of the Syrian population – are in need of humanitarian assistance. Nearly 6.5 million people are internally displaced, of which 50% are children. In addition, by September 2014, around 3 million Syrians had left Syria, registering as refugees in surrounding countries. In the northern areas of Syria – which are under the control of opposition forces – the central Government is often no longer providing basic services (water, electricity, waste management, etc.). While local governance

structures have emerged, these are often under resourced and lack the capacity to fulfil the role of service provider.

This action aims at improving access to primary and secondary education and the provision of complementary nutrition, education and psychosocial support to school-age children in Syria.

## **2.2. Context**

### *2.2.1. Syrian crisis context*

The Syrian conflict, now in its fourth year has led to one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent decades. In addition, the regional impact of the crisis has been amplified to a point that the crisis now risks destabilising the entire region, exacerbating divisions along religious, ethnic and political lines, particularly in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.

With neither side able to gain a military victory, and barring a swift political solution, the conflict looks set to escalate in an unpredictable manner in Syria and perhaps beyond, potentially leaving a legacy of sectarian violence and conflict for years to come.

During 2014 the number of conflict-related deaths surpassed 190,000, with 650,000 injured. Besides the high numbers of IDPs and people in need of assistance, access remains a critical issue: at least 4.6 million Syrians are in areas hard to reach by humanitarian assistances as a result of insecurity. Over 241,000 people are in locations besieged by the Government or opposition groups without access to basic services.

#### *2.2.1.1. Economic and social situation and poverty analysis*

Syria's economic situation continues to worsen. Economic activity has dropped and/or stopped in many places as a consequence of the war. Since 2011, the economy has contracted considerably with estimates ranging from 40% to 60% of gross domestic product (GDP as of early 2014). GDP per capita, education rates and health standards have declined substantially, as many public infrastructures have been destroyed or damaged. Labour market participation rates have probably decreased even further. Estimates based on the latest labour force survey from 2011 suggest that the number of employed people declined by 55% between 2011 and the end of 2013. The unemployment rate is estimated to have increased from 10% to 54% during the same period, in a context of large numbers of IDPs, refugees and growing informality. The lack of economic opportunities has contributed to an increase of poor households; approximately 75% of the population now lives in poverty, and approximately 54% in extreme poverty.

But the impacts and costs of the Syrian crisis extend well beyond Syria's borders: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that by the end of 2014 the number of Syria refugees will reach 3.59 million, with 1.5 million refugees in Lebanon, 1 million in Turkey, 700,000 in Jordan, 250,000 in Iraq and 140,000 in Egypt. Were this to be the case, this would mean that by the end of this year Syrian refugees would account for more than 30% of the Lebanese and 16% of the Jordanian population. The Regional Response Plan for 2014 estimates that the cost of addressing the impact crisis in Lebanon and Jordan was USD 1.8 billion and USD 1.3 billion respectively. These countries and are now confronted with a situation which threatens their internal stability in the absence of substantial additional international support. In addition, the fate of the 529,000 Palestine

refugees that were living in Syria adds another threat to the political and stability of both countries.

#### 2.2.1.2. National development policy

Syria's national development objectives have normally been laid out in a series of 5 year plans. The 10<sup>th</sup> five-year plan covered the period 2006-2010 and while the 11<sup>th</sup> five-year plan for 2011-2015 was drafted, it was not officially adopted. Due to the violence and unacceptable human rights situation, the Council of the European Union suspended EU bilateral cooperation with the Government of Syria in May 2011. Since then EU's economic and development assistance to address the Syrian crisis under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and its successor the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) has been channelled mainly through UN organisations and NGOs. UN organisations, as well as a number of NGOs, are currently working from Damascus (although a number of organisations also have offices in various governorates) and serve both Government-held and opposition-held areas (through cross-line operations). Meanwhile, a number of other NGOs are working from either southern Turkey or Lebanon and serve predominately opposition-held areas (through cross-border operations). The main priorities with regard to both humanitarian and early recovery (development) actions inside Syria are outlined in the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) January to December 2014, prepared in coordination between the United Nations System, the Government of Syria, and humanitarian actors in Syria.

This action supports a number of the activities foreseen under the SHARP, in particular those linked to education.

#### 2.2.2. *Sector context: policies and challenges*

The education system is severely affected by the crisis, which limits children's access to education and undermines educational achievement. Despite the crisis, according to the Syrian Ministry of Education, four million children were enrolled at grades 1-12 in Syria for the school year 2013-14. However, an estimated one million children still remain out of school due to ongoing conflict and massive internal displacement. Low attendance rates are confirmed especially in hard-to-reach areas. Whilst the national average attendance rate still stands at 73%, the percentage varies greatly across the country. This implies that another million children, albeit registered with schools, are not going to school on a regular basis. That means that approximately half of school-aged children inside Syria are no longer attending schools regularly. UNICEF reports an acute paucity of functioning learning spaces, with more than 4,000 schools (approximately 1 out of 5) across the country damaged, destroyed, used as IDPs shelters or occupied by parties to the conflict.

In the international context, the comparison of the net enrolment rate of primary education between Syria and other countries showed that Syria ranked number 21 in 2010 out of 136 countries (WDI, 2013), but based on current enrolment, using the 2010 data, it is estimated that Syria has fallen to the bottom of the ranking in the 135<sup>th</sup> position, i.e. the second worst performance in the world.

Children have been subject to a range of physical, psychological and grave violations of their rights, including recruitment into armed groups. The psychosocial impact of the crisis on both individuals and Syrian society as a whole has been severe. The UN has warned of a "lost generation" in Syria due to the disproportionate impact that the conflict is having on children and youths and the lack of access to education, vocational training and psychosocial services.

At the same time, the conflict's negative impact on food and nutrition security threatens children's cognitive as well as physical development, compromising their ability to learn even when they are able to attend school. UN agencies report that many children enrolled in education facilities are too hungry to concentrate on lessons.

This situation requires an articulated response, providing different types of assistance (in particular educational and nutritional) to the children in need.

### **2.3. Lessons learnt**

Given: i) the relatively recent onset of the crisis, ii) the fact that these interventions are designed to mitigate the impacts of the crisis and, iii) the on-going conflict situation, no independent reviews (like results-oriented monitoring) or external evaluations have yet been undertaken. However, reports from on-going projects show that despite the risks and complexities of operating in Syria during the conflict it is still possible to achieve results. Due to the dynamic nature of the conflict and shifting battle lines there is need for a considerable degree of flexibility in implementing projects so that they can adapt to these changes while still responding to beneficiaries' needs. In order to try to reduce tensions between communities, projects supporting vulnerable populations – such as IDPs or Palestine refugees – should also include host communities and other Syrians in need.

The regional nature of the crisis as well as the twin-pronged response (both humanitarian and economic and development assistance) require a high degree of coordination in order to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure complementarity between the various actions. Lastly, there is a need for better reporting on the results that are being achieved.

### **2.4. Complementary actions**

The EU has responded to the Syrian crisis by progressively making available increasing amounts of funding in order to match the escalating needs. To date, the EU has contributed more than EUR 2.8 billion with EUR 1.3 billion coming from EU Member States and more than EUR 1.5 billion from the EU budget which includes around EUR 665 million in humanitarian aid provided by the Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO). While humanitarian assistance is generally focused on immediate lifesaving activities, economic, stabilisation and development assistance is working on the "other side of the humanitarian line" to support measures that seek to minimise the medium to long term impacts of the crisis (civil society organisations' capacity building, education, support to livelihoods, access to basic services, etc.). The Commission continues to ensure a clear division and complementarity between humanitarian and economic, stabilisation and development assistance and its various funding instruments. The actions proposed are thus also complementary to those funded by the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace in Syria under the "Regional Support Programme for Populations Affected by the Crisis in Syria"<sup>1</sup> and the "Assistance to Conflict Affected Communities in Syria, including through the Support to Civilian Structures of the Opposition"<sup>2</sup>. Despite the suspension of bilateral aid with the Government of Syria a number of economic and development projects implemented mainly through the UN and/or NGOs are still going on and further projects are expected to be

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<sup>1</sup> C(2012) 8720 of 27.11.2012.

<sup>2</sup> C(2013) 2602 of 05.05.2013.

contracted before the end of 2014. On-going projects inside Syria in the Education sector under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) particularly include:

- i) "Creating a path to early recovery for Education in Syria" which is implemented through a contribution agreement with UNICEF for an amount of EUR 15.7 million. This project is expected to assist vulnerable and displaced children to access education and psycho-social support. The current action is conceived as a direct follow-up of this former project and expected to scale up its results.
- ii) "Engaging Youth Phase II" which is implemented through a contribution agreement with UNWRA for an amount of EUR 7.3 million. The 54 month project is expected to improve employability of Palestine refugees and Syrians by providing them with technical and vocational training to improve their skills.

The project will – where appropriate and operationally necessary – be coordinated with other actions implemented by other donors, in support of – or directly by - the Interim Government or any other structure of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.

## **2.5. Donor coordination**

Concerning Syria, due to the fact that assistance is using different delivery mechanisms ("cross-line" and "cross-border"), donor coordination is taking place in a number of different fora at different levels. These include:

- The informal "core group" on donor coordination for recovery, resilience, and development response to the Syria crisis which is chaired by the EU and includes key bilateral and multilateral donors. This group aims at improving the effectiveness of development assistance provided in response to the Syrian crisis, both inside Syria and in the neighbouring countries, but does not include humanitarian activities which are coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
- In addition, coordination is also conducted in the frame of the Working Group on Economic Recovery and Development of the Friends of Syrian People. Here the focus is on coordination of donor support to the opposition held areas of Syria which is mainly supported from southern Turkey (cross-border), although there is also cross line support.
- The UN also co-chairs a number of sectoral coordination meetings based in Damascus.

There is very close and regular internal coordination within the European Commission between the various services involved in the response and with the European External Action Service. The Joint Communication "Towards a Comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis"<sup>3</sup> helps provide the framework for coordinating all aspects of the EU response to the crisis.

In addition, the revised "Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan" (SHARP) provides a coordinated response strategy for all UN agencies and humanitarian actors.

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<sup>3</sup> JOIN (2013) 22 final of 24.06.2013.

### **3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION**

#### **3.1. Objectives**

The overall objective of the action is *to contribute to the mitigation of the risk of a "lost generation" in Syria due to the disproportionate impact that the conflict is having on children and youths and the lack of access to education, vocational training and psychosocial services.*

The specific objective of the action is *to contribute to improving access and attendance rates to primary and alternative education for children and adolescents most affected by the conflict in selected intervention areas in Syria.*

#### **3.2. Expected results and main activities**

The action has two components for which the expected results and corresponding activities are detailed below.

##### **3.2.1. Component 1 - Assisting vulnerable and displaced children in Syria to access education**

This component will be implemented by UNICEF. It will support the scaling up of activities that are already being supported under the on-going Contribution Agreement "Creating a path to early recovery for Education in Syria" which was signed in June 2013 for an amount of EUR 15.7 million. The action on access to education through distribution of supplies and textbooks will be expanded to at least 500,000 more children. Under the current action, the creation of school clubs providing remedial classes and recreational activities, the self-learning programmes and the provision of remedial education and vocational life skills training for adolescents will be continued. The action on physical environmental support for education will continue to be improved, replacing rehabilitation of damaged schools with pre-fabricated classrooms which are more appropriate for the Syrian crisis context. The activities on training for teachers, protection and psychosocial support, early childhood development and the scholarships programme for girls on vocational education will also continue.

##### Expected results and indicative activities:

Result 1: Access to basic education within the targeted areas is provided for all children, including adolescents.

Activity 1.1: Provide basic teaching and learning materials (school bags, stationery, textbooks);

Activity 1.2: Print and distributing self-learning programme material;

Activity 1.3: Roll-out the self-learning programme in the selected governorates.

Result 2: Children within the targeted areas are provided with remedial education, psycho-social support and recreational activities.

Activity 2.1: Create School-clubs, including the provision of remedial education classes, of recreational activities (i.e. sports) and of psychosocial support.

Result 3: The physical learning environment of the targeted schools is improved.

Activity 3.1: Provide safe learning spaces such as pre-fabricated classrooms.

Result 4: Teachers' capacities on protection and psychosocial skills is improved.

Activity 4.1: Induction / training on active learning methodology for school club teachers;

Activity 4.2: Provide specialised training for teachers.

Result 5: Vulnerable children of less than 6 years have access to Early Childcare Development programmes.

Activity 5.1: Develop programmes and materials;

Activity 5.2: Build capacities of staff and parents, including on psycho-social support.

Result 6: Remedial education and vocational education for adolescents are made available to out of school children and children at risk of dropping out, including specific scholarships for girls.

Activity 6.1: provide adolescents remedial education;

Activity 6.2: provide adolescents vocational training;

Activity 6.2: Award scholarships for girls for formal school, remedial or vocational training programmes.

Result 7: A management and monitoring system for the two programme components is in place and running.

Activity 3.1: Together with WFP, set up a joint data management system for the two programme components;

Activity 3.2: Monitor the programme results, including gender elements.

### 3.2.2. *Component 2- School feeding programme*

This component aims at providing nutritious fortified snacks to food insecure and vulnerable primary school children so that they are encouraged to enrol and regularly attend school. The provision of the snacks will also aim at supporting local production and distribution.

This component will benefit at least 200,000 children and take place in schools already covered by UNICEF under component 1 of the present project. Areas with the highest drop-out rates will be targeted in priority to provide incentives for school attendance. The timeframe for this component is foreseen to be one school year (September-June). The two components will be regularly aligned and coordinated.

Expected results and activities:

Result 1: At least 200,000 children receive a nutritious snack every day at school.

Activity 1.1: Distribute snacks.

Result 2: Local suppliers' capacity is enhanced and production standards meet international nutrition standards.

Activity 2.1: Contract local suppliers;

Activity 2.2: Train the school personnel in running the programme.

Result 3: A management and monitoring system for the two programme components is in place and running.

Activity 3.1: Together with UNICEF, set up a joint data management system for the two programme components;

Activity 3.2: Monitor the programme results, including gender elements.

### **3.3. Risks and assumptions**

The risks of operating in Syria during the conflict are clearly significant. Projects will have to include a high degree of flexibility in order to ensure that they can adapt to the changing situation on the ground. The main risk is the deterioration of the already grave security situation in Syria. Localised occurrences can be mitigated by projects either temporarily or permanently relocating staff and activities. There is a risk of duplication of EU funding between humanitarian and development activities. This continues to be mitigated by close and frequent coordination between the relevant Commission services based on an agreed division of labour. In addition, there is a risk of duplication of EU funding for development activities given that a number of actions are addressing similar objectives. This will be mitigated by ensuring a clear targeting of beneficiaries (including geographical aspects), information sharing and coordination among the various partners, and ensuring that UN agencies adhere to their respective mandates.

### **3.4. Cross-cutting issues**

All components of this action will integrate issues of human rights and gender equality into the implementing projects. Where relevant and feasible, all indicators will be broken down by gender.

### **3.5. Stakeholders**

The direct stakeholders are the respective UN organisations (UNICEF and WFP), their grant beneficiaries and selected contractors.

## **4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**

### **4.1. Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

### **4.2. Indicative operational implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in sections 3.2 and 4.3 will be carried out, is 36 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement or, where none is concluded, from the adoption of this Action Document, subject to modifications to be agreed by the responsible authorising officer in the relevant agreements. The European Parliament and the relevant Committee shall be informed of the extension of the operational implementation period within one month of that extension being granted.

### **4.3. Implementation components and modules**

#### *4.3.1. Indirect management with an international organisation*

This action with objective to contribute to improving access and attendance rates to primary and alternative education for children and adolescents most affected by the conflict in selected intervention areas in Syria may be implemented in indirect management with UNICEF for component 1 and with WFP for component 2 in accordance with Article 58(1)(c) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. This implementation is justified because; i) bilateral aid is currently suspended and; ii) both these organisations have an international mandate to implement the activities in their respective component. Component 1 is the continuation of an on-going project with UNICEF (2013/318-335).

These international organisations will be responsible for the award, signing and management of contracts (grants and procurement) and for making payments.

These entrusted entities are currently undergoing the ex-ante assessment in accordance with Article 61(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. In anticipation of the results of this review, the responsible authorising officer deems that, based on a preliminary evaluation and on the long-standing and problem-free cooperation with these entities, it can be entrusted with budget-implementation tasks under indirect management.

The change of management mode from indirect to direct management, where partially or entirely, is not considered a substantial change.

The Commission authorises that the costs incurred by the entrusted entities UNICEF and WFP may be recognised as eligible as of 1<sup>st</sup> September 2014, in order that the action can increase access to education and nutrition in schools from the start of the school year 2014-2015.

#### **4.4. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants**

Subject to the following, the geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement procedures and in terms of origin of supplies and materials purchased as established in the basic act shall apply.

In accordance with Article 9(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014; the Commission decides that natural and legal persons from the following countries having traditional economic, trade or geographical links with neighbouring partner countries shall be eligible for participating in procurement and grant award procedures: Turkey, Iraq. The supplies originating there shall also be eligible.

The responsible authorising officer may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

#### **4.5. Indicative budget**

<b>Module</b>	<b>Amount in EUR thousands</b>	<b>Third party contribution (indicative, where known)</b>
4.1. – Indirect management with:		
4.1.1 UNICEF	11,970	N.A.
4.1.2 WFP	3,000	1,923
4.2. – Evaluation and audit	30	N.A.
<b>Totals</b>	<b>15,000</b>	<b>1,923</b>

#### **4.6. Performance monitoring**

Appropriate reporting measures indicators and quantitative targets will be incorporated into each contract. While primary responsibility for the monitoring of the performance of each of the components rests with the implementing organisation, the EU will closely monitor performance by each of the implementing organisations and reserves the right to carry out verification missions as necessary.

#### **4.7. Evaluation and audit**

Each of the 2 contracts will include a final end of term review as part of the contract. A mid-term review is also foreseen for each of the 2 contracts after the end of the first school year. These will be paid for under the respective contract. The EU may contract an independent evaluation to be paid from budget line 4.2.

The EU may undertake an ad hoc overall final evaluation and audit covering the two components at the end of implementation if considered necessary. Any such evaluation would be contracted by the EU.

The two contracts shall be subject to the auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules and directives of that organisation.

#### **4.8. Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated before the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 4.5 above.

The measures shall be implemented either (a) by the Commission, and/or (b) by the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, financing agreements, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

To date the visibility of the EU's support to the Syrian crisis has been insufficient.

The public perception is that the EU is not addressing the Syrian crisis, when in fact it is the largest donor. The lack of visibility to the EU's actions weakens the EU's political traction in the region and its standing in Europe. While EU visibility within Syria should be judged on a case-by-case basis, as it could jeopardise the safety and security of an implementing organisation's staff, any reduction in the visibility should be compensated by an increase in other means, for example by ensuring that beneficiaries are regularly informed by word-to-mouth that the support they are receiving is from the EU. In addition, visibility actions by implementing partners outside the area of conflict should be stepped up. Each implementer will have to draw up a comprehensive visibility and communication plan and submit a copy to the EU Delegation. The related costs will be covered by the budgets of the two contracts.

**ANNEX 4**

of the Commission implementing Decision on the 2014 special measure for the Syrian population

**Action Document for "Scaling-up of emergency restoration and stabilisation of livelihoods of affected Syrian populations"**

**1. IDENTIFICATION**

Title/Number	Scaling-up of emergency restoration and stabilisation of livelihoods of affected Syrian populations CRIS number: ENI/2014/351-068		
Total cost	Total estimated cost: EUR 4,050,000 Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 4,050,000		
Aid method / Management mode and type of financing	Project Approach Indirect Management with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)		
DAC-code	730	73000	Recovery

**2. RATIONALE AND CONTEXT**

**2.1. Summary of the action and its objectives**

Currently in its fourth year, the crisis in Syria continues unabated, at a devastating cost for people suffering not only in Syria but in neighbouring countries as well. In addition to loss of lives, debilitating injuries, internal displacement and forced migration, Syrians are being thrust into poverty by the day more than ever before. 75% of the population currently lives in poverty and 54% in extreme poverty. With regard to the Human Development index (HDI), the conflict has rolled back Syria's human development achievements by 35 years. The unemployment rate is estimated to have reached 54% at the end of 2013.

In order to respond to more and more destitution of the Syrian population that could lead to continuation of the conflict featuring also radicalisation, the EU has been funding the UNDP for a livelihood programme that started in January 2014. The programme aims at addressing the immediate needs of affected households and communities while also laying the building blocks for medium and long-term recovery and development. This resilience-based development approach allows a longer-term perspective from the outset, focusing on strengthening the capacity of communities to cope with the crisis through immediate emergency interventions, livelihoods, housing, infrastructure and basic services as well as by recovering from the socio-economic impact of the crisis.

With the increasing destitution and new areas of "relative stability" emerging, UNDP is gearing its field structures and plans to upscale its interventions through expanding the number of beneficiaries.

## 2.2. Context

### 2.2.1. Country context

#### 2.2.1.1. Economic and social situation and poverty analysis

Anti-government "Arab Spring" protests in 2011 were met with brutal crackdowns. By 2012, the uprising against Bashar Al-Assad had spiralled into a dramatic civil war that has killed more than 191,000 by August 2014 and triggered a severe economic recession. After almost four years of crisis, approximately 75% of the population now live in poverty with 54% people living in extreme poverty. Unemployment was estimated to have increased to more than 50% of the labour force by the end of 2013. Estimates based on the latest labour force survey from 2011 suggest that the number of employed people declined by 55% between 2011 and the end of 2013.

The Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) estimates that the Syrian gross domestic product (GDP) has declined by 4% in 2011, 31% in 2012, and 38% in 2013. Accordingly, Syria's GDP in 2013 dropped to 41% of the 2010, i.e. pre-crisis level. The contraction in GDP is concentrated in four key economic sectors: the wholesale and retail trade sector (including hotels and restaurants), transport, mining (primarily petroleum), and the manufacturing sector. Together these sectors accounted for about two thirds of the overall estimated decline in GDP until the end of 2013.

Recent reports<sup>1,2</sup> show that the Syrian economy has experienced massive de-industrialisation as a result of business closure and bankruptcy, capital flight, looting and destruction. Syria's economic loss was USD 103 billion by the second quarter of 2013, equivalent to 174% of its 2010 GDP in constant prices. Damage to capital stock of USD 49 billion accounted for 48% of this loss. This lost capital will have to be replaced from new financing sources in any future rehabilitation and re-industrialisation of the Syrian economy. Private consumption contracted by 40% in the first quarter and 47% in the second quarter of 2013 compared to the same quarters in 2012, reflecting the dire economic and financial circumstances facing Syrian households as the armed conflict intensified in the first half of the year. Further, in 2013 more than 20,000 businesses were estimated to have closed down.

The livestock sector has been seriously depleted by the ongoing conflict. Poultry production is estimated to be down by more than 50% compared to 2011, and sheep and cattle numbers are down approximately 35% and 25% respectively. To cope with the crisis Syrian livestock owners have been selling their animals in neighbouring countries without the usual quarantine controls posing a serious threat to animal health in the region.

It is worth noting that in 2013/14 at least 1.47 million tons of wheat would need to be imported to meet the demand of the country (estimated to be at 4 million tons in 2010/11). This may further increase wheat flour price volatility. The projected drought in Syria will also affect crop production in rain-fed areas potentially leading to further reliance on imports.

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<sup>1</sup> Syrian Center for Policy Research (Oct 2013): War on Development, Impact of the Crisis report.

<sup>2</sup> UN-ESCWA report (Sep 2014): The Conflict in Syria: implications on the macro-economy and MDGs

Available data suggests that Syria's economy is drifting towards hyperinflation. Data issued by the Central Bureau of Statistics shows that the Consumer Price Index in 2013 had increased by about 90% compared to the beginning of the conflict in 2011. Despite the sharp official increase, the actual figure may be substantially higher, and is likely to vary widely across the country, reflecting the fragmentation of Syria's economic space. The sharp increase in prices might reflect the substantial fiscal pressure which is potentially leading to a monetisation of the fiscal deficit contributing to acceleration of inflation in order to curb recurrent expenditures. Poor and vulnerable households are likely to have been worst hit as the highest price increases were for essential items such as electricity and gas, basic food, and clothing.

The economic decline has left many Syrians exposed to high food and fuel prices which have increased food insecurity and other forms of vulnerability. Purchasing power has declined in the face of rising food, fuel and medicine prices. The prices for food, clothes, electricity and gas have almost doubled by the first quarter of 2013<sup>3</sup>. The official price of fuel increased dramatically by at least 185% during the year. Economic and financial sanctions (discussed further below) have placed additional pressure on trade, including on the import of essential goods and services, upon which Syria has come to increasingly rely on. In addition to the higher prices, food access is compromised by the low quality of food available on the markets, the insecurity, the transport constraints, the credit for suppliers, and the foreign currency shortage.

The formal economy has imploded. There has been a growth in informality, rent-seeking activities, criminal enterprise and economies of violence that pose risks to post-conflict economic regulation, reform and equity. Failing a radical reversal of fortunes on the ground, the economic outlook for 2014 and beyond appears equally grim. As the crisis is in its 4<sup>th</sup> year, the spectrum of a "lost generation" of youth, with very little access to education or work, looms over Syria. Around half of school-aged children are no longer going to school on a regular basis. In addition to the 2.9 million increase in the number of unemployed at the end of 2013, part of the population, particularly the youth, has joined conflict-related livelihood activities to make a living. Sustained social and economic pressures will continue to erode the resilience of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and local communities, and the requirements for humanitarian assistance will remain high. If these trends continue, there will be enormous long term development impacts.

Sanctions and financial regulations contribute to overall economic decline which in turn exacerbates hardship, through commodity shortages, high prices and deteriorating public services. In such a crisis-ridden economy even "humanitarian goods" such as medical supplies that are nominally exempt from sanctions are immediately subject to price inflation once they arrive on the Syrian market. Sanctions impact the lives of ordinary people, and have contributed to the slide in the value of the Syrian Pound (SYP), causing major hardship across all affected groups.

In an effort to minimise the effect of sanctions, the Central Bank of Syria imposed a series of tight restrictions on foreign currency transactions at the end of 2013.

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<sup>3</sup> Syria Centre for Policy Research (SCPR) 'Syria War on Development - socioeconomic monitoring report of Syria', October 2013, for UNRWA and UNDP.

Although some exemptions for UN agencies and international staff have been accepted the result has been a more constricted and challenging trading environment. For example, foreign exchange payments to local suppliers are now forbidden with few exceptions. This makes food procurement extremely difficult, especially in places like north and central Syria (Aleppo in particular) where agencies must continue to use local suppliers to make timely deliveries to refugees.

Additional factors are increasing the number of Syrians' in need. Not only the international sanctions and the ongoing drought, but the reinforcement of the Islamic State (IS) as an international force within territories in Syria's governorates (Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Al-Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor) is causing further constraints on civilian population with serious limitations for the access of humanitarian aid.

#### 2.2.1.2. National development policy

Syria's national development objectives have normally been laid out in a series of 5-year plans. The 10th five-year plan covered the period 2006-2010 and while the 11th five-year plan for 2011-2015 was drafted, it was not officially adopted. Due to the violence and unacceptable human rights situation, the Council of the European Union suspended EU bilateral cooperation with the Government of Syria in May 2011. Since then EU's economic and development assistance to address the Syrian crisis under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) has been channelled mainly through UN organisations and NGOs. UN organisations, as well as a number of NGOs, are currently working from Damascus (although a number of organisations also have offices in various governorates) and serve both Government-held and opposition-held areas (through cross-line operations). Meanwhile, a number of other NGOs are working from either southern Turkey or Lebanon and serve predominately opposition-held areas (through cross-border operations). The main priorities with regard to both humanitarian and early recovery (development) actions inside Syria are outlined in the "Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan" (SHARP) January to December 2014, prepared in coordination between the United Nations System, the Government of Syria, and humanitarian actors in Syria.

This action supports a number of the activities foreseen under the SHARP, in particular those linked to livelihood.

#### 2.2.2. *Sector context: policies and challenges*

The magnitude of the humanitarian crisis has already resulted in massive efforts from governmental and non-governmental organisations both national and international as well as donors and United Nations (UN) agencies. Thus far, a robust humanitarian response has been organised around the "Syrian Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan" (SHARP) inside Syria and Regional Response Plans (RRPs) in neighbouring countries affected. Funding needs are extremely high and there is consensus among the international community that the response to the crisis needs to be revisited. Considering that the crisis is affecting the broad spectrum of human development indicators<sup>4</sup>, there is a clear need to switch from a purely humanitarian response to a

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<sup>4</sup> The indicators are: poverty, spatial and gender inequalities, employment, livelihood and housing, education, health, nutrition, water and sanitation and the environment.

more sustainable and resilience-based development response that will build on and complement the ongoing humanitarian response.

For actions inside Syria, UNDP is implementing actions in livelihoods, early recovery and for building resilience in line with its development mandate. As the response to protracted conflict has a high risk of perpetuating dependency and exacerbating horizontal inequality and intergroup polarisation, the programme is informed with conflict analysis in a two-fold approach: (1) It is important to avoid the people in need to recur to negative coping mechanisms such as removing children from school, reducing the quality and quantity of food consumed, residing in crowded and unsanitary shelters, begging, using child labour or forced marriage as income sources, engaging with armed groups and other high-risk income-generating activities; (2) the resilience-based development response is guided by a deeper understanding of power dynamics integrating conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms.

The scaling up of the activities is justified by the assumption that the most likely scenario is a continuation of the current political stalemate with serious consequences on the fragile economic and security situation of the country described above.

Indeed the challenges are immense. More than 6.5 million people are estimated to be internally displaced (including Palestine refugees in Syria), many located on border areas attempting to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. Many internally displaced households have resorted to negative coping mechanisms to survive. Food insecurity is likely to remain dire for the foreseeable future as the conflict in Syria continues. Livelihood loss, deepening poverty, inflation and steep depreciation of the SYP will continue to erode the capacity of families to meet basic needs and cope with the crisis. The most vulnerable affected groups will remain unable to produce or access adequate food to meet basic needs, necessitating a continued and expanded provision of multiple forms of emergency food and agricultural assistance. Where the situation allows, emphasis will be placed on restoring and stabilising people's livelihoods and strengthening community resilience through providing emergency employment opportunities for the restoration of basic community services such as solid waste management and revival of small businesses in affected areas. This will help the beneficiaries to satisfy their basic needs, improve their living conditions and pave the way for restoring basic community services.

In addition, the increasing fragmentation and multiplicity of armed groups, coupled with rising rhetoric and targeting violence on ethnic and religious grounds has added a new dangerous dimension to the conflict and is spilling over into neighbouring countries.

### **2.3. Lessons learnt**

Over the past three years, UNDP gained valuable experience in developing and implementing area based interventions to enhance the resilience of the affected population and their ability to cope with the impact of the crisis. UNDP extracted several lessons learnt from the above mentioned experience which fed into its ongoing programme and interventions at the field level.

The bottom up approach in identifying the needs and priorities of the affected communities ensures an early engagement with the concerned people allowing them

to be involved in the implementation of the response programmes and directly benefiting from the rendered services. In this regard, the importance of following an area based planning approach which relies on needs expressed from the field is one of the lessons learnt. While UNDP is working under the umbrella of the SHARP document with already established objectives, the importance of the involvement of local communities (affected population, host communities, internally displaced and other key representatives) in planning and designing activities is crucial to ensure success of interventions and create ownership of the projects at the community level.

The deteriorating security situation and the difficult accessibility to critical areas in need of support and assistance enforced the importance of the role of local partners (non-governmental organisations - NGOs, community based organisations - CBOs, local committees, etc.). Working through local partners, building their capacities, acknowledging and enhancing their role as service providers are key factors in achieving tangible results and reaching desirable impact. This highlights the importance of conducting capacity development for local NGOs who proved over the past three years to be key players in reaching out to the people in need, addressing the impact of the crisis and enhancing their coping mechanism. Relying on local partners and assigning local staff at the field level whether directly through UNDP or through local recruitment agencies are additional factors of success ensuring accessibility, addressing sensitivity and allowing for better monitoring of implemented activities.

Following principles such as the do no harm principle and ensuring conflict sensitive planning are other key elements in ensuring successful end result. Conflict sensitive planning is notably adopted when devising the area-response plans mainly to examine the dynamics between host communities and IDPs or among the IDPs themselves. Such analysis is constantly updated by UNDP field and technical teams in Damascus for urgent actions and shift in the programme design. UNDP promotes for an engagement of local host communities in activities targeting IDPs by factoring a minimum of 30% of services and opportunities targeting the host communities. This enables both groups to get together and enjoy a better understanding of the other, particularly when IDPs come from different social and religious backgrounds than the host communities.

At another level, while mass procurement of non-food items needed by the affected population is much easier and cheaper from international resources, it became evident that taking the effort to map local disrupted industrial facilities, explore their capacities and conduct local procurements through those small facilities is an effective element in reviving local businesses and economy and in restoring disrupted livelihoods. This approach helps maintaining and creating longer term jobs and economic opportunities, providing demand to disrupted industries, encouraging return of IDPs to relatively secure areas and discouraging displacement which is in many cases triggered by economic factors and not only security issues. Furthermore, establishing a link between international organisations, international NGOs and local sewing workshops supported by UNDP in partnership with local NGOs proved very effective in providing a market and creating demand for those facilities thus ensuring durability and continuity of activities beyond the project duration.

## **2.4. Complementary actions**

This action is integrated in the “Syrian Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan” (SHARP) and is conceived to complete humanitarian activities. UNDP notably ensures cooperation and coordination with other UN agencies operating in the humanitarian field in Syria for harmonised interventions and complementarities. Cross-border operations as authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 2165 have notably started at the end of July 2014 and a ‘Whole-of Syria’ planning is currently being developed to ensure that cross-lines operations and cross-border operations are complementary.

The action will capitalise on previous UNDP’s interventions in the context of the Syrian crisis and on the partnerships built over time by UNDP in Syria with local partners and stakeholders, in particular local associations, NGOs and CBOs in addition to various think tanks and faith based organisations (mainly churches) and private sector. UNDP, through its previous work on development in Syria and the current recovery and resilience interventions has gained a thorough understanding of the diversity in Syria and the needed spectrum of interventions as a response to the crisis mainly under the changing priorities and dynamics in the social fabric and economic conditions in the country. UNDP incorporates humanitarian and recovery principles in the design, planning and implementation of sub-initiatives foreseen in the project.

The EU also supports the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) through the programme "Education for vulnerable and displaced children in Syria" in Syria as well as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for the programme "Enhancing the Protection of Vulnerable Palestine Refugees in Syria". In addition the EU Delegation Syria is in the process of evaluating proposals from international NGOs on livelihood projects that would complement the UNDP action. Finally, a scoping mission of the Department for International Development (DFID) for livelihood activities in opposition held areas in Syria is currently undergoing, with EU Delegation Syria participation and its outcome could identify further complementary actions in the livelihood sector that could be interesting to support.

The Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF), which has been established in 2013 and is currently funded by a number of EU Member States and non EU-countries aims at funding larger scale rehabilitation projects inside Syria. There are gaps in addressing smaller scale actions that can respond to dynamically evolving need.

The projects will – where appropriate and operationally necessary – be coordinated with other actions implemented by other donors, in support of – or directly by - the Interim Government or any other structure of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.

## **2.5. Donor coordination**

Concerning Syria, due to the fact that assistance is using different delivery mechanisms ("cross-line" and "cross-border"), donor coordination is taking place in a number of different fora at different levels. These include:

- The informal "core group" on donor coordination for recovery, resilience, and development response to the Syria crisis which is chaired by the EU and

includes key bilateral and multilateral donors. This group aims at improving the effectiveness of development assistance provided in response to the Syrian crisis, both inside Syria and in the neighbouring countries, but does not include humanitarian activities which are coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

- In addition, coordination is also conducted in the frame of the Working Group on Economic Recovery and Development of the Friends of Syrian People. Here the focus is on coordination of donor support to the opposition held areas of Syria which is mainly supported from southern Turkey (cross-border), although there is also cross line support.
- The UN also co-chairs a number of sectoral coordination meetings based in Damascus.

There is very close and regular internal coordination within the European Commission between the various services involved in the response and with the European External Action Service. The Joint Communication "Towards a Comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis"<sup>5</sup> helps provide the framework for coordinating all aspects of the EU response to the crisis.

In addition, the revised "Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan" (SHARP) provides a coordinated response strategy for all UN agencies and humanitarian actors.

### **3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION**

#### **3.1. Objectives**

The overall objective of the proposed project is to strengthen the resilience of the Syrian people to cope with the effects of the protracted crisis and enable those whose livelihoods were severely disrupted to recover and rebuild their lives.

The project's specific objectives are:

- a) Ensuring a well-coordinated livelihoods and early recovery response that provides IDPs and their host communities with rapid employment opportunities to enhance service delivery and rehabilitate basic community infrastructure;
- b) The creation and stabilisation of basic livelihoods in view of supporting spontaneous recovery efforts or coping mechanisms. Special attention will be given to creating such opportunities to youths, women headed household and persons with disability.

For the planning and implementation of this project, UNDP refers to the United Nations policy on "Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration" and relies on the pertinent guiding principles set for the three track support to employment:

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<sup>5</sup> JOIN (2013) 22 final of 24.06.2013.

- Track A: Stabilising income generation and emergency employment.
- Track B: Local economic recovery for employment opportunities and reintegration.
- Track C: Sustainable employment creation and decent work.

While all three tracks promote employment their focus is different: livelihoods stabilisation (Track A) such as emergency employment schemes, targeted self-employment support (especially livelihood start-up grants and packages) and infrastructure rehabilitation; medium- to long-term local economic recovery including interventions that aim at boosting sustainable employment, income generation, and reintegration (Track B); long-term employment creation and inclusive economic growth (Track C). All three tracks are observed in any phase of the recovery but their intensity generally peaks at different times.

### **3.2. Expected results and main activities**

The expected results are:

1. Emergency employment for improved service delivery and restoration and repair of basic services and social infrastructure.

Activities will consist in cash-for-work wages for at least 4,000 people, agreements with NGOs and CBOs, covering costs of materials, costs of money transfer companies/money vendors, rehabilitation of water networks, schools, health centres and other community priority infrastructure.

2. Emergency support for restoration of disrupted livelihoods.

Activities will consist in responding to the urgent needs of  $\pm$  1,500 displaced families and their host families, to cope with the consequences of the crisis. Direct support will be offered to provide grants to revive small businesses and distribution of tool kits and productive assets. Vocational training will be considered as a main element in this component in order to equip the unemployed and affected persons with the necessary skills for the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase.

3. Emergency support for women headed households.

Activities will consist in emergency employment for women to generate quick earnings to support their families even if it is for a short period of time. It is foreseen that  $\pm$ 2,800 women in affected communities and/or public shelters will benefit from rapid cash for work schemes in addition to vocational training and start-up kits.

4. Emergency support and rehabilitation for persons with disabilities.

Activities will consist in a comprehensive rehabilitation programme for at least 3,000 persons starting with provision of disability and medical aids (such as prosthetics, artificial limbs, crutches, wheelchairs, medical pillows and mattresses, among other needed items), physiotherapy sessions, vocational training and start-up kits for quick income generating activities and finally psychosocial support.

5. Support to social cohesion and community resilience.

Activities will consist in empowering people and institutions to cope with the consequences of the on-going crisis. Focus will be put on developing the capacities of 70 NGOs/CBOs to engage in emergency responses with particular focus on livelihoods and early recovery initiatives and promote social cohesion and reconciliation through community based activities, including 25 small grants. Thus, a significant emphasis on local level interventions will be considered. This can be promoted through the establishment of local community groups (in four governorates) to facilitate the implementation of coordinated humanitarian and livelihoods activities and paving the way for more reconciliatory actions among various community groups.

### **3.3. Risks and assumptions**

Assumptions:

- The security situation remains stable.
- Active coordination among the main stakeholders remains.
- No-double funding between the ongoing programme and the scaling up.

Risks:

- The risks of operating in Syria during the conflict are clearly significant. Projects will have to include a high degree of flexibility in order to ensure that they can adapt to the changing situation on the ground. The main risk is the deterioration of the already grave security situation in Syria.
- Intense increase in number of Syrian IDPs jeopardises the capacity of the host communities and partners to respond.
- Compromised in-country peace and stability.

Mitigating measures:

The abovementioned risks underlie all projects attempting to operate inside Syria. Increasing strategic coordination and timely exchange of information between key stakeholders and taking stock of lessons learnt may mitigate the risks. The organisation entrusted with the project will make full use of its experience and response mechanisms to ensure risk mitigation. Finally, the necessary flexibility will be used to cope with changes or deterioration of circumstances.

### **3.4. Cross-cutting issues**

- *Gender equality promotion:* girls and women from both the Syrian IDPs and host communities face significant barriers in accessing economic empowerment, being also most of the time head of households. The programme intends to address the unequal access to job creation and ensure an equal balance between male and female workers.
- *Fighting against extremism:* Livelihood is a driver of inclusive growth and poverty reduction. Providing youth with quality vocational training and job

opportunities is essential to integrate well in the society and to become less vulnerable and less inclined to fall into the trap of extremism.

- *Human rights:* Access to decent and safe work are fundamental rights; offering safe environment for workers and prevent exploitation and exposure to hazardous labour are among the most important International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. Furthermore, by providing income generating activities to adults' head of households, child labour will be strongly reduced as it happens regularly in conflict situations. Therefore this action aims to ensure that vulnerable and displaced youth can continue accessing education.

### **3.5. Stakeholders**

The main stakeholders are the UNDP and the NGOs and CBOs that are implementing the programme in the field.

The direct beneficiaries of the programme are Syrian IDPs and host communities. The scaling up of the ongoing livelihood programme will increase the number of beneficiaries according to the following criteria: IDPs and host communities, people with disrupted livelihoods (housing, source of income, assets etc.), women-headed households (families who lost their primary income earner), people with disabilities and youth.

From a geographical point of view the scaling up of the project will adapt to the highly diverse situations in affected communities, UNDP resorted to an area-based response approach with different implementation modalities and with different types of local and international partners. UNDP is now actively operating in twelve governorates (Aleppo, Damascus, Dara'a, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Hassakeh, Homs, Idleb, Latakia, Raqqa, Rural Damascus, and Tartous) either through field presence, outsourced personnel, private service providers and/or partner NGOs. The extended network of partners and various implementation modalities are essential to overcome operational and access challenges, and ensure higher flexibility in response and resilience to security and other shocks in the target areas.

The choice of the area and target groups is guided by regularly updated governorate profiles, including a situation analysis of different socio-economic and vital sectors in the target governorate to update needs, priorities, local partnerships and risks. An area-based response plan is then developed and updated in close consultation with local stakeholders under the framework of UNDP's mandate in livelihoods, early recovery and resilience.

## **4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**

### **4.1. Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

**4.2. Indicative operational implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in sections 3.2. and 4.3. will be carried out is 48 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement or, where none is concluded, from the adoption of this Action Document, subject to modifications to be agreed by the responsible authorising officer in the relevant agreements. The European Parliament and the relevant Committee shall be informed of the extension of the operational implementation period within one month of that extension.

**4.3. Implementation components and modules**

*4.3.1. Indirect management with an international organisation*

This action, with the objective of strengthening the resilience of the Syrian people to cope with the effects of the protracted crisis and enabling those whose livelihoods were severely disrupted to recover and rebuild their lives, may be implemented in indirect management with UNDP in accordance with Article 58(1)(c) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. This implementation is justified because: i) bilateral aid is currently suspended and; ii) This organisation has an international mandate to implement some activities foreseen in the project.

The entrusted entity would be responsible for the award, signing and management of contracts (grants and procurement) and for making payments.

This entrusted entity is currently undergoing the ex-ante assessment in accordance with Article 61(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. In anticipation of the results of this review, the responsible authorising officer deems that, based on a preliminary evaluation and on the long-standing and problem-free cooperation with this entity, it can be entrusted with budget-implementation tasks under indirect management.

**4.4. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants**

Subject to the following, the geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement procedures and in terms of origin of supplies and materials purchased as established in the basic act shall apply.

In accordance with Article 9(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014; the Commission decides that natural and legal persons from the following countries having traditional economic, trade or geographical links with neighbouring partner countries shall be eligible for participating in procurement and grant award procedures: Turkey, Iraq. The supplies originating there shall also be eligible.

The responsible authorising officer may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

**4.5. Indicative budget**

Module	Amount in	Third party
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	<b>EUR thousands</b>	<b>contribution</b>
4.1 Indirect Management with UNDP	4,050	N.A.
Totals	4,050	N.A.

#### **4.6. Performance monitoring**

UNDP will regularly report to the Commission on the use of committed funds and programme implementation and provide ad hoc information on this additional funding for the Syria programme through joint financial expenditure verification under the special measure for the Syrian population. The report on programme implementation shall also focus on project results, obstacles, lessons learnt and any useful information for improving the programming and identification.

#### **4.7. Evaluation and audit**

The contract will include a final end of term review as part of the contract. Annual reviews are also foreseen. These will be paid for under the respective contract.

Evaluations (mid-term, final, ex post) and audit arrangements are integral part of the contractual arrangements with the selected delegatee.

The contract shall be subject to the auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules and directives of that organisation.

The EU may undertake an ad hoc overall final audit at the end of the implementation if considered necessary. Any such audit would be contracted by the EU financed from a separate financing decision.

#### **4.8. Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated before the start of implementation and supported with the budget of the project.

The measures shall be implemented either (a) by the Commission, and/or (b) by the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, financing agreements, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

To date the visibility of the EU's support to the Syrian crisis has been insufficient.

The public perception is that the EU is not addressing the Syrian crisis, when in fact it is the largest donor. The lack of visibility to the EU's actions weakens the EU's political traction in the region and its standing in Europe. While EU visibility within

Syria should be judged on a case-by-case basis, as it could jeopardise the safety and security of an implementing organisation's staff, any reduction in the visibility should be compensated by an increase in other means, for example by ensuring that beneficiaries are regularly informed by word-to-mouth that the support they are receiving is from the EU. In addition, visibility actions by implementing partners outside the area of conflict should be stepped up. Each implementer will have to draw up a comprehensive visibility and communication plan and submit a copy to the EU Delegation. The related costs will be covered by the budgets of the two contracts.

**ANNEX 5**

of the Commission implementing Decision on the 2014 special measure for the Syrian population

**Action Document for a "Joint comprehensive EU framework for cross-border operations in Syria from Turkey"**

**1. IDENTIFICATION**

Title/Number	Joint comprehensive EU framework for cross-border operations in Syria from Turkey CRIS number: ENI/2014/351-055		
Total cost	Total estimated cost: EUR 5,500,000  Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 5,000,000  At least 10% of the EU contribution to the action will be co-financed in parallel co-financing by the participating EU Member States agencies.		
Aid method / Management mode and type of financing	Project Approach Indirect management with Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)		
DAC-code	430	Sector: 43010	Multiple Sectors: Health; Water/Sanitation; Education; Food security/livelihood; Agriculture; Civil defence; Sub-granting/micro-projects

**2. RATIONALE AND CONTEXT**

**2.1. Summary of the action and its objectives**

The action aims to ensure that EU and EU Member States cross-border development projects are implemented in a more coherent and effective way to better respond to needs inside of Syria. The action will cover multiple sectors and intends to complement humanitarian and non-humanitarian activities in hard to reach areas inside of Syria. It will foster synergies between existing EU Member States and EU funded initiatives.

**2.2. Context**

The Syrian conflict is having a devastating and lasting impact on Syria and across the region. With the conflict in its fourth year, the needs of the affected populations for assistance, including 10.8 million people inside the country and more than 3 million

refugees plus their overstretched host communities in neighbouring countries, are of an unprecedented scale. The number of conflict-related deaths has surpassed 191,000 individuals.

In 2013, the Syria crisis has transformed itself from a humanitarian emergency to a multidimensional and protracted crisis directly affecting several countries in the region - mainly Lebanon and Jordan, but also Iraq, Turkey and Egypt - whose social and economic capacity to deal with the ever growing influx of refugees is all but exhausted. All actors involved in the response agree that this massive challenge requires a comprehensive regional response not only including humanitarian aid but also longer-term structural support to host countries and communities through development instruments, especially as no political solution to the crisis are in sight in the short-term. The neighbouring countries, despite limited resources and domestic challenges, are shouldering the majority of the response to the refugee crisis and cannot cope with it in the long term without significant support from the international community. This is especially true for Lebanon and Jordan with their comparatively small population and limited resources, reaching the limits of their stability as more refugees flow in from Syria.

In response to the crisis, the EU (including its Member States) has so far mobilised EUR 2.8 billion of assistance since the start of the conflict (EUR 1.5 billion from the EU budget and EUR 1.3 billion from EU Member States), making it the main donor in addressing the consequences of this crisis. In 2013 only, the Commission made an exceptional effort of EUR 685 million, notably thanks to the EUR 400 million additional package mobilised in the frame of the Joint Communication “Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis”<sup>1</sup>.

This assistance has allowed for urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance and supported the national and local capacities to deliver services for those affected by the crisis (education, health, basic services such as water and waste management services, support to livelihoods, etc.), both inside Syria and in the neighbouring countries. In Turkey, until now, needs have been mostly covered by Turkey's national funds; only limited funding of EUR 13 million has been provided so far under the Instrument for Pre-accession which is designed mainly for institution building and not for emergency assistance, and 5 million under the Instrument for Stability aiming to build resilience for Syrian children and youth in Turkey.

The majority of the European Commission development assistance has been funded by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument<sup>2</sup> (ENPI) through a series of special measures for Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. This support has focused mainly on education, health and livelihood sectors and is expected to ensure that: 2.5 million children affected by the crisis are able to continue to go to school; 50,000 young people benefit from vocational or life-skills training; that 425,000 of the most vulnerable men, women and children have improved access to health services; that 760,000 of the poorest people affected by the crisis receive livelihood support; that the capacity of 85 local Syrian civil society organisations (CSOs) is improved; and that more than 1,100 activists, bloggers and journalists are trained.

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<sup>1</sup> JOIN(2013) 22 of 24.6.2013.

<sup>2</sup> Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, OJ L 310, 9.11.2006, p. 1.

## 2.2.1. *Country context*

### 2.2.1.1. Economic and social situation and poverty analysis

More than three years into a conflict that is estimated to have killed at least 191,000 people, the Syrian economy lies in ruins. Assets and infrastructure have been destroyed, 75% of the population lives below the poverty line, and the human development index has fallen back to where it stood 37 years ago. It is estimated that even with average annual growth rate of 5% it would take nearly 30 years to recover Syria's 2010 gross domestic product (GDP) value.

The Syrian economy has witnessed four stages of decline provoked by the outbreak of the conflict, the imposition of sanctions, the expansion of fighting into the country's economic powerhouses and the opposition seizure of the resource-rich northeast (notably by the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - ISIL"). Nonetheless, regime-controlled areas remain resilient particularly because of the critical support provided by domestic and international allies.

The expansion of the war economy in opposition-controlled areas has been fuelled by the intra-rebel fight for lucrative resources such as oil fields and grain stores, but the rise of state militias and the impact of sanctions have also created powerful new networks on the regime side. A growing number of groups on both sides of the divide now reap significant material benefit from the conflict, which gives them a powerful incentive to prolong the fight.

The relative autonomy gained by local stakeholders is creating new power centres that are likely to clash with any future central Government. The entrenched fragmentation of the economy means that areas controlled by the regime and the opposition have become increasingly disconnected.<sup>3</sup>

In view of a large part of Syria's economy having shifted into a parallel war economy, it is currently extremely difficult to obtain viable indicators for economic performance and national statistics have become utterly unreliable.

### 2.2.1.2. National development policy

Bilateral development cooperation between the EU and the Syrian Arab Republic remains suspended. The Damascus-based Syrian government does not exert the monopoly of power in all areas of Syria anymore. There is therefore no national development policy in place. Large parts of Syria are under the control of different military/political factions and the protracted nature of the Syrian crisis produces shifting alliances and creates humanitarian and linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) needs that need to be swiftly responded to.

## 2.2.2. *Sector context: policies and challenges*

Currently, there is no national policy that governs service provision in many parts of Syria, as large parts of the country are no longer under the control of the Syrian Government in Damascus. These areas are rather controlled by different armed

<sup>3</sup>

[http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR97\\_SYRIA\\_BRIEF\\_AW.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR97_SYRIA_BRIEF_AW.pdf).

factions. Services are mostly provided by local councils and civil society organisations.

Implementation of activities across Syria is challenged by a lack of direct access in many parts of the country, due to a volatile security situation and a lack of a coherent governance structure, following three years of a political turmoil.

Humanitarian aid provided by the UN and its implementing partners is governed by UN Security Council Resolution 2165, dated 14 July 2014, which authorises to use routes across conflict lines and border crossings to ensure that assistance reaches people in need throughout Syria.

On a European level the EU Foreign Affairs Council of 14 April 2014 states that “where possible the EU is committed to increase its support to areas that are not under regime’s control by all possible channels on the basis of a coordinated approach”.

In 2013, the EU allocated EUR 10 million from the Instrument for Stability to three EU Member State agencies to implement an exceptional assistance measure entitled “Assistance to conflict affected communities in Syria, including through support to civilian structures of the opposition”<sup>4</sup> which is implemented primarily through cross-border assistance from southern Turkey. In July 2014, three EU Member States agencies<sup>5</sup> drafted a set of proposals to improve cross-border operations from Turkey.

### **2.3. Lessons learnt**

The experience in cross-border operations from Turkey into Syria, which matured over the past two years, has shown that, despite the increasing challenges and access constraints, such operations are possible and vital to support local structures and populations in need in areas that would not be reached by other means.

Synergies between the existing EU Member States agencies projects demonstrated that a coordinated approach and a more integrated implementation of activities generates better results and facilitates work processes compared to the similar set of activities implemented separately by the single agencies.

Experience also shows that local technical expertise, flexibility and reactivity are key to such operations. When measured against the current framework in which the three EU Member States agencies operate, those capacities should be significantly improved.

Projects aiming at a long-term impact for the beneficiary communities they work with should last long enough to build the sustainability of their actions. A longer-term predictability is therefore essential for the development and the management of such projects. It would allow the agencies to create long-lasting structures, to foster better relationship with local partners, hire, train and retain qualified staff in

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<sup>4</sup> C(2013) 2602 of 2.5.2013.

<sup>5</sup> i.e.: *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ, Germany), *France Expertise International* (FEI, France) and *Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo del Ministero Italiano degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale* (DGCS, Italy).

Gaziantep. This can only be achieved within projects lasting a minimum of 24 months.

Taking stock of the impact and challenges of the existing European-led cross-border operations, this action proposes to develop the existing set-up and consequently to provide the EU and the EU Member States with an improved operational framework to ease and increase its cross-border assistance into Syria. It aims at translating into practice the ideas developed in the above-mentioned set of propositions and consequently, to better cater for the needs of the populations and local partners in Syria.

#### **2.4. Complementary actions**

In view of the United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2165 humanitarian access has increased, but large gaps in the international response remain. The proposed initiative will be complementary to the current humanitarian responses, as it focuses its activities on building medium-term structures that could lay the ground work for early recovery measures.

The Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF), which has been established in 2013 and is currently funded by a number of EU Member States and non EU-countries aims at funding larger scale rehabilitation projects inside Syria. There are gaps in addressing smaller scale actions that can respond to dynamically evolving needs, including capacity building for Syrian counterparts.

EU Member States have been carrying out different projects aiming at providing basic services and humanitarian assistance to the population in Syria. Their response has been fragmented and partly uncoordinated, especially in the non-humanitarian sector. Attempts for EU Member States coordination have been initiated at the Gaziantep level by the European External Action Service.

"The project will – where appropriate and operationally necessary – be coordinated with other actions implemented by other donors, in support of – or directly by - the Interim Government or any other structure of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces."

The present project is meant to serve as a framework to use synergies between existing individual EU Member States projects in order to foster coordination and a better and more efficient response to needs on the ground. It will also increase coordination with EU funded initiatives. Close attention will also be paid not to overlap and to coordinate with ongoing activities such as those supported by the European Commission's Humanitarian aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO).

The present project can be seen as the continuation of the Instrument for Stability-funded exceptional assistance measure "Assistance to conflict affected communities in Syria, including through support to civilian structures of the opposition"<sup>6</sup> by adding a medium-term perspective, a broader base of implementation partners and by introducing the largest possible integration of projects managed by participating agencies.

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<sup>6</sup> C(2013) 2602 of 2.5.2013.

## 2.5. Donor coordination

The EU Delegation can no longer participate in donor coordination inside Syria.

Concerning Syria, due to the fact that assistance is using different delivery mechanisms ("cross-line" and "cross-border"), donor coordination is taking place in a number of different fora at different levels. These include:

- The informal "core group" on donor coordination for recovery, resilience, and development response to the Syria crisis which is chaired by the EU and includes key bilateral and multilateral donors. This group aims at improving the effectiveness of development assistance provided in response to the Syrian crisis, both inside Syria and in the neighbouring countries, but does not include humanitarian activities which are coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
- In addition, coordination is also conducted in the frame of the Working Group on Economic Recovery and Development of the Friends of Syrian People. Here the focus is on coordination of donor support to the opposition held areas of Syria which is mainly supported from southern Turkey (cross-border), although there is also cross line support.
- The UN also co-chairs a number of sectoral coordination meetings based in Damascus.

There is very close and regular internal coordination within the European Commission between the various services involved in the response and with the European External Action Service. The Joint Communication "Towards a Comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis"<sup>7</sup> helps provide the framework for coordinating all aspects of the EU response to the crisis.

In addition, the revised "Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan" (SHARP) provides a coordinated response strategy for all UN agencies and humanitarian actors.

As concerns grant projects implemented in a country that is behind a smokescreen, however, coordination at the regional/international level is at least as important as coordination between the grant recipients and other implementers on the ground. The EU Delegation also tries to play a facilitating role in that regard, despite the adverse circumstances of being evacuated to Brussels. A consultation meeting of international CSOs active in Syria has been hosted in Brussels by the EU Delegation on the 9<sup>th</sup> April 2014, and a special session was held for CSOs active in Syria that are funded by the EU in order to encourage information sharing and best practices between different implementing partners. Many CSOs active in Syria attend OCHA hosted Humanitarian Coordination/Working Groups, either in Gaziantep, Beirut, Amman or Damascus. However, designated coordination groups on non-humanitarian activities are generally lacking, and the EU services try to play a coordinating role, where they can.

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<sup>7</sup> JOIN (2013) 22 final of 24.6.2013.

To that end, the EU common workspace in Gaziantep hosts regular EU coordination meetings with EU Member States implementing agencies to coordinate assistance in project form by EU bilateral donors. The present action is expected to significantly increase donor coordination at EU Member States level and will also enhance the role which the EU Delegation can play here.

### 3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

#### 3.1. Objectives

The overall objective is to better respond to needs of Syrians by ensuring that EU and EU Member States development projects are implemented in a more coherent and effective way through a joint comprehensive framework. This framework will better link EU Member States projects, for them to make joint strategic decisions based on joint assessments and monitoring with a view to use resources more effectively. It will also allow for a more timely and reactive response to identified needs.

The specific objectives are:

- to provide basic services to the Syrian population and contribute to strengthening local governance through the implementation of flexible and short-term delivery projects in Syria with local civil partners.
- To decrease community tensions by addressing the needs of Syrian refugees on Turkish territory.

#### 3.2. Expected results and main activities

<u>Expected results</u>		<u>Expected activities: (non-exhaustive list)</u>	
1.	Sustainable projects and/or highly efficient short-term delivery projects		
1.1	Sustainable projects and/or highly efficient short-term delivery projects are created in the field of health.	1.1.1	Setting up and support to Primary health care centres (PHC).
		1.1.2	Setting up and support to maternities.
		1.1.3	Supply of drugs, medical equipment and consumable.
		1.1.4	Creation of a reasonable stock of health equipment and consumables in Gaziantep to ensure fluid delivery to the projects. The stock could also be used for result 2.
1.2	Sustainable projects and/or highly efficient short-term delivery projects are created in the field of water and sanitation.	1.2.1	Equipment and restoration of wells, boreholes and water supply system.
		1.2.2	Training and capacity building

			of technical staff in sustainable water management, analysis of water quality and maintenance of networks.
		1.2.3	Supply of water and sanitation equipment. Creation of a reasonable stock of water and sanitation equipment in Gaziantep to ensure fluid delivery to the projects.
1.3	Sustainable projects and/or highly efficient short-term delivery projects are created in the field of education.	1.3.1	Setting up and support to schools.
1.4	Sustainable projects and/or highly efficient short-term delivery projects are created in the field of Food security/livelihoods.	1.4.1	Equipment and restoration of mills.
		1.4.2	Equipment and restoration of bakeries.
		1.4.3	Training and capacity building in the management and running of mills and bakeries.
		1.4.4	Supply of flour/wheat. Creation of a reasonable stock of flour/wheat in Gaziantep to ensure fluid delivery to the projects.
		1.4.5	Support to livelihood opportunities.
1.5	Sustainable projects and/or highly efficient short-term delivery projects are created in the field of agriculture.	1.5.1	Supply of seeds or vegetables. Creation of a reasonable stock of farming seeds in Gaziantep to ensure fluid delivery to the projects.
		1.5.2	Training and capacity building of technicians and farmers on seed multiplication, efficient use of resources etc.
		1.5.3	Supply of agricultural and farming equipment including for irrigation. Creation of a reasonable stock of farming equipment (including for irrigation) in Gaziantep to ensure fluid delivery to the projects.
1.6	Sustainable projects and/or highly efficient short-term delivery projects are created in	1.6.1	Supply equipment such as rubble removal equipment, fire extinction & rescue

	the field of civil protection.		equipment. Creation of a reasonable stock of civil protection equipment in Gaziantep to ensure fluid delivery to the projects.
		1.6.2	Training of staff on the usage, maintenance and repair of the delivered equipment.
2.	Support structures delivering direct services to the Syrian refugees in Turkey.	2.1	Improving access to health centres dedicated to Syrian refugees.
		2.2	Improving access to education services dedicated to Syrian refugees.

### 3.3. Risks and assumptions

The main risks associated with this project are:

#### Regarding partners:

- The structures within Syrian civil society are rapidly evolving with high turn over of staff, weak accountability mechanisms and are subject to frequent changes.
- The risk of aid being "instrumentalised" by partners inside Syria.
- As for projects carried out in Turkey, the evolving policy toward Syrian refugees by the Turkish authorities will directly impact the nature and scope of activities to be conducted.

#### Regarding access:

- It is assumed that the situation in the neighbouring countries will remain such that working with Syrian entities within and from Turkey and access into Syria will still be possible.
- Given that the project is implemented remotely from Turkey, access to certain parts of Syria remains unpredictable over security concerns.

#### Regarding mismanagement & programme outcomes:

- Furthermore to the project being managed remotely, risks of mismanagement or misuse of project resources by partners are definitely high.
- It is assumed that the project can increase the legitimacy of local structures. If this does not come as a direct result, it should however be noted that the principal objective of this programme is to assist civilian populations regardless of affiliation.
- Due to access restrictions and volatile security conditions, sustainability of the project intervention could be hampered and therefore cannot be guaranteed.

### Mitigating measures:

The abovementioned risks underlie all single projects attempting to operate inside of Syria. It is assumed that by increasing strategic coordination and exchange of information between key EU Member States agencies as well as pooling respective implementing experience, this joint approach may mitigate the overall risk as compared to individual projects. It is to be noted that the activities foreseen under 3.2 are not humanitarian response but oriented towards setting the pace for recovery.

#### **3.4. Cross-cutting issues**

The present decision aims to implement its activities with a gender sensitive approach that aims to foster gender equality.

Activities will have to demonstrate how they will support human rights and fundamental freedoms (for example: right to life, freedom of expression and association, equal rights, tolerance, human dignity, principles of non-violence).

The decision will require environmental mainstreaming into all projects to make them as energy efficient and environmentally sustainable as possible.

#### **3.5. Stakeholders**

Principal stakeholders will be provincial/local civilian service and utility providers as well as provincial/local community actors in Syria and potentially other Syrian provisional institutions and organisations cooperating with the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) subject to agreement in a steering mechanism between the project partners and the EU Delegations in Syria and Ankara on a case-by-case basis notably to ensure that all actions are in line with EU policy objectives and financial procedures. The identification process of these stakeholders will take into account previous successful partnerships within EU Member States bilateral projects. Final beneficiaries will be the local communities they are active in. Implementing partners will be encouraged to work as much as possible in cooperation with CSOs in order to help this sector survive through the crisis.

### **4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**

#### **4.1. Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country, referred to in Article 184(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012.

#### **4.2. Indicative operational implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in sections 3.2. and 4.3. will be carried out is 48 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement or, where none is concluded, from the adoption of this Action Document, subject to modifications to be agreed by the responsible authorising officer in the relevant agreements. The European Parliament and the relevant Committee shall be informed of the extension of the operational implementation period within one month of that extension being granted.

**4.3. Implementation components and modules**

*4.3.1. Indirect management with a Member State agency*

This action with the objective of ensuring that EU and EU Member States development projects are implemented in a more coherent and effective way to better respond to needs inside of Syria may be implemented in indirect management with GIZ in accordance with Article 58(1)(c) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (in sub-delegated partnership with other EU Member States agencies, such as FEI and perhaps DGCS). This implementation is justified because GIZ has a significant presence and project experience concerning project implementation in Syria from Gaziantep. Among EU Member States agencies, GIZ has the strongest capacity for this type of project implementation from Gaziantep.

The entrusted entity would contribute to establishing a common project steering framework and to a large extent, delegate budget management activities to the participating EU Member States agencies and other possible partners.

The entrusted entity intends to sub-delegate the execution of the budget to other EU Member States agencies, according to their respective capacities and previous experiences in specific sectors and areas of intervention. Appropriate provisions will be included in the delegation agreement. Such provisions will take into account the different levels of presence of EU Member States Agencies in Gaziantep in order to ensure the maximum possible participation.

The entrusted entity is currently undergoing ex-ante assessment in accordance with the Article 61(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. In anticipation of the results of this review, the responsible authorising officer deems that, based on a preliminary evaluation and on the long-standing and problem-free cooperation with this entity, it can be entrusted with budget-implementation tasks under indirect management.

**4.4. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants**

Subject to the following, the geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act shall apply.

In accordance with Article 9(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014; the Commission decides that natural and legal persons from the following countries having traditional economic, trade or geographical links with neighbouring partner countries shall be eligible for participating in procurement and grant award procedures: Turkey, Iraq. The supplies originating there shall also be eligible.

The responsible authorising officer may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the implementation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

**4.5. Indicative budget**

Module	Amount in	Third party
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	<b>EUR thousands</b>	<b>contribution (indicative, where known)</b>
4.3.4. – Indirect management with GIZ	5,000	500
Totals	5,000	500

#### **4.6. Performance monitoring**

The performance of the project will be closely monitored by the project implementing body. Appropriate reporting and reviewing measures will be built into each contract/agreement to ensure close follow-up on part of the Commission. The Commission reserves the right to carry out verification missions as needed. External results-oriented monitoring missions may also be carried out by the Commission.

#### **4.7. Evaluation and audit**

The contract will include a final end of term review as part of the contract. Annual reviews are also foreseen. These will be paid for under the respective contract. Special attention will be paid to the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) dimension of this joint project. A M&E framework with measurable indicators will be developed. The project will be the opportunity to test a new M&E mechanism relying on local NGOs as third-party monitoring. To this end, a group of 8-10 local NGOs is currently being identified to take part in a M&E concepts and methodology training. Special attention will be paid to the evaluation aspect that should go beyond the routine monitoring (picture, videos etc.) and look more broadly at the impact/changes brought about by the project activities in the communities. Once trained, these local NGOs are expected to become an additional asset that could be shared among agencies to improve the current monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for remotely-managed cross-border activities inside Syria.

Evaluations (mid-term, final, ex post) and audit arrangements are integral part of the contractual arrangements with the selected delegatee.

The contract shall be subject to the auditing procedures laid down in the financial regulations, rules and directives of that organisation.

The EU may undertake an ad hoc overall final audit at the end of the implementation if considered necessary. Any such audit would be contracted by the EU financed from a separate financing decision.

#### **4.8. Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated before the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 4.5 above.

The measures shall be implemented either (a) by the Commission, and/or (b) by the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and entrusted entities. Appropriate

contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, financing agreements, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.